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So we beat on Boats against the Current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. 
—The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald 
PROLOGUE: HOW EQUITY CONQUERED COMMON LAW 
Professor Steve Subrin’s central ideas in his seminal article How Equity 
Conquered Common Law were that the equity tradition in procedure suppressed 
the common law tradition in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the 
emphasis on equity brought undesirable consequences. 
Steve’s concluding paragraphs are indispensable to what follows: 
Our infatuation with equity has helped us to forget the historic purpose of 
adjudication. Courts exist not only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a 
way that takes law seriously by trying to apply legal principles to the events that 
brought the parties to court. The total victory of equity process has caused us to 
forget the essence of civil adjudication: enabling citizens to have their legitimate 
expectancies and rights fulfilled. We are good at using equity process and 
thought to create new legal rights. We have, however, largely failed at defining 
rights and providing methods for their efficient vindication. The effort to defeat 
formalism so that society could move forward toward new ideas of social justice 
neglected the benefits of formalism once new rights had been created. The mo-
mentum toward case management, settlement, and alternative dispute resolution 
represents, for the most part, a continued failure to use predefined procedures in 
a manner that will try, however imperfectly, to deliver predefined law and rights. 
We need judges who judge as well as judges who manage. We need oral 
testimony, oral argument, and juries to balance documents, judges, and magis-
trates. This is not a plea for arid formalism that overemphasizes the value of 
form. Nor is it a plea for uncontrolled juries. This is a reminder that there is an-
other rich tradition to draw upon, that the common law virtues of form and focus 
are necessary to help us develop methods that can realize our rights. It is a re-
minder that law and equity developed as companions, and that equity set adrift 
without the common law may in fact be Maitland’s “castle in the air.” The cure 
for our uncontrolled system does not require the elimination of equity. It does 
require that we revisit our common law heritage.1 
Equity, Steve argued, was too amorphous, too unfocused, and too diffuse, 
leading to the subject of this modest effort—equitable discretion. 
INTRODUCTION 
I have taken two cracks at equitable discretion.2 If this one differs, it is be-
cause over time I came to know my characters a little better. 
                                                        
1  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 1001–02 (1987) (footnote 
omitted). 
2  See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL 
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT (2010) [hereinafter RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION]; Doug 
Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 
REV. LITIG. 63 (2007) [hereinafter Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion]. 
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This article has two parts: it starts in part I with a summary of what we 
know as equitable discretion. Then, part II surveys decision points in litigation 
where equitable discretion arises. It concludes that, although the tension in pro-
cess and ideology is eternal, the legal system’s general need for rules and 
standards supports Steve’s views except in measuring the winning plaintiff’s 
remedy where the system needs equitable discretion. 
I. EQUITABLE DISCRETION 
Our summary begins in ancient Athens with Aristotle. “Equity,” which in a 
common translation of his Nichomachaen Ethics, “is a rectification of law 
where it fails through generality.”3 To elaborate: 
Whenever then the terms of the law are general, but the particular case is an 
exception to the general law, it is right, where the legislator’s rule is inadequate 
or erroneous in virtue of its generality, to rectify the defect which the legislator 
himself, if he were present, would admit, and had he known it, would have recti-
fied in legislating.4 
Aristotle’s Ethics continues. “[A]ll law is couched in general terms, but 
there are some cases upon which it is impossible to pronounce correctly in gen-
eral terms.”5 An equitable man is one who will not, in an exceptional situation, 
insist upon his rights; he will not apply the general rule in its full rigor. Equity 
is a form of dispensation.6 
Our path to contemporary equitable discretion shifts to legal historian 
S.F.C. Milsom’s observation about Common Law and Chancery (another word 
for Equity), the dual court systems of Medieval England. “The discussion about 
the relative importance in a legal system of certainty and abstract justice is un-
ending,” Milsom wrote, “but it begins at a definite stage of development, name-
ly when the law is first seen as a system of substantive rules prescribing results 
upon given states of fact. In England this discussion was at once institutional-
ised: certainty resided in the common law courts, justice in the chancellor’s eq-
uity.”7 
The Court of Chancery embodied equitable discretion as a practice and 
policy. In 1615, in the Earl of Oxford’s Case, the Chancellor wrote that “The 
Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infi-
                                                        
3  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 172 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., Macmillan 1912) (c. 384 
B.C.E.). 
4  Id.  
5  Id. at 171. 
6  Id. at 172–73. Joe Sachs’s more recent translation of Aristotle’s Ethics uses “decency” in-
stead of “equity” for “epieikeia” because “decency” is, he writes, more accurate. Aristotle is 
seeking “[a] sense for what is appropriate” in deciding when to depart from a general rule. 
“Aristotle is describing something that goes beyond what is equitable (to ison). Decency is 
one of Aristotle’s most frequent ways of naming human goodness.” ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 203 (Joe Sachs trans., Focus Publ’g 2002). 
7  S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 94 (2d ed. 1981). 
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nite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with 
every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances,” which led him to 
conclude that “[t]he Office of the Chancellor is . . . to soften and mollify the 
Extremity of the Law.”8 
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone, paraphrasing Aristotle and quoting 
Grotius, wrote: 
[F]rom this method of interpreting laws, by reason of them, arises what we call 
equity; which is thus defined by Grotius, “the correction of that, wherein the law 
(by reason of its universality) is deficient.” For since in laws all cases cannot be 
foreseen or expressed, it is necessary, that when the general decrees of the law 
come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vest-
ed of excepting those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legisla-
tor himself would have excepted. And these are the cases, which, as Grotius ex-
presses it “lex non exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit.”9 
Medieval Chancery was a court of conscience because its orders to the de-
fendant to “do your duty” expressed the Chancellor’s conscience and operated 
on the defendant’s conscience. The Chancellor enforced the Maxim that “Equi-
ty Acts In Personam” through personal or in personam orders enforceable by 
coercive contempt. These included the Chancellor’s power to jail or fine a re-
calcitrant or stubborn defendant until he obeyed.10 A “Lost Maxim of Equity” 
expresses Chancery’s transition from conscience to coercion: “Equity Is Soft 
and Chewy on the Outside, But Hard and Crunchy on the Inside.”11 
“Justice” is an appealing concept. But, following Steve’s analysis, it is an 
amorphous, unfocused, and diffuse one. Law means that people are governed 
through a system of rules that judges apply generally to similar disputes. Critics 
like Steve challenge the Chancellor’s discretion: too much discretion means 
unequal law, indeed no law at all. John Selden’s widely-quoted comment from 
the late seventeenth century focused on the Chancellor’s subjectivity: 
[E]quity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is 
larger or narrower so is equity. “Tis all one, as if they should make his foot the 
standard for the measure we call a Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure 
would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an 
indifferent foot.”12 
In the late eighteenth century, Lord Camden’s focus on Chancery and equi-
table discretion shifted from subjectivity to arbitrariness and corruption. “[T]he 
discretion of a Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is different 
                                                        
8  Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep 485, 486 (1615). 
9  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press 2009) (1765). 
10  RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 629; SARAH WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 
15–16 (2d ed. 2006). 
11  Apologies to Gene Volokh for reversing his Lost Maxim. See Eugene Volokh, Lost Max-
ims of Equity, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619 (2002). 
12  Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 679 n.1 (1818) (quoting JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE-
TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., 1892)). 
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in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper, and pas-
sion. In the best it is often times caprice, in the worst it is every vice, folly, and 
passion to which human nature is liable.”13 
In the late nineteenth century, after the American Chancellor learned to en-
join strikes in In re Debs,14 a critic of equitable discretion wrote that “[t]he pre-
sent Chief Justice of the United States, before he became the head of the bench, 
remarked of a reforming member of the Chicago bar, ‘Brother B. would codify 
all laws in an act of two sections: 1st, All people must be good; 2d, Courts of 
equity are hereby given full power and authority to enforce the provisions of 
this act.’ ”15 
The late Peter Birks felt so strongly that “discretionary remedialism” was 
an outrage against certainty and predictability that he advocated dissolving the 
study of remedies as a separate inquiry and putting the winner’s formerly re-
medial portion under the appropriate substantive head.16 
Critics move from caprice and corruption to politics in robes. A judicial 
decision isn’t the inevitable result of adding a column of established legal prin-
ciples. Discretion allows the judge to implement a political platform. Proce-
dure, context, the events, the litigants, the lawyers’ strategies and tactics, re-
search, and the judge’s disposition affect the result. 
A more positivistic approach relies less on the judge’s strength of character 
and more on developing principles, standards, and rules to structure, confine, 
and limit the judge’s discretion.17 An approach that contrasts to Aristotle’s flex-
ibility holds that if “particular injustice sometimes necessarily result[s] from the 
operation of general rules,” the general rules “cannot be departed from to suit 
particular cases,” even though moral injustice or disgrace may occur.18 
Beginning with the Field Codes in the United States in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Common Law and Chancery courts were merged.19 The 
                                                        
13  JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1356 (1992) (quoting Doe v. Kersey (1795) (C.P.) (Unreported)); see 
also BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 328–29 (1839); Richard B. Spindle, Judicial Discretion in 
Common Law Courts, 4 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 143, 143 (1947). 
14  In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
15  Charles Noble Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. REV. 487, 510 (1898); 
see also Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 976–79 (2010). 
16  Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16–17, 35–36 
(2000); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 930 (1999); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
No Final Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity’s Triumph in Federal Public Law, 56 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 105, 117–18; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989). 
17  David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546–47, 589 
(1985). 
18  Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207, 209 (1825); but see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 
YALE L.J. 509, 538 (1988). 
19  Subrin, supra note 1, at 932. 
1402 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1397  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the late 1930s were the merger’s major 
milestone. In Steve’s story, this is when the redoubt fell—equity conquered the 
common law.20 
Law-equity divisions are fading.21 But the divided institutional courts per-
sist. Virginia, a commonwealth that lets others try out innovations for a century 
or more, waited until 2006 to merge its dual courts.22 Delaware Chancery, the 
nation’s premier business court, will be with us for the foreseeable future. Equi-
ty guides boards’ and officers’ fiduciary duties in corporate law applied in Del-
aware Chancery and elsewhere.23 
Substantive areas formerly associated with Chancery are trusts, fiduciary 
relationships, mortgages and liens, wills, estates, and divorce. “Notwithstand-
ing the fusion of law and equity by the Rules of Civil Procedure,” the Supreme 
Court said in 1949, “the substantive principles of Courts of Chancery remain 
unaffected.”24 As the California court put it, “We perceive in this fusing of the 
two former rescission procedures no intention on the part of the Legislature to 
disturb, much less eradicate, substantive differences theretofore underlying 
such procedures.”25 Many of these areas of substantive equity have developed 
into independent substantive-law fields, often heavily statutory today. The stat-
utory systems retain the earmarks of equity, including the absence of a jury, 
contempt enforcement, and equitable discretion. 
Two examples of equitable discretion in statutory substantive equity areas 
will suffice. First, in family law in Canavos v. Canavos, a Virginia court held 
that the chancellor has discretion to provide that the order for family support 
payments should not be a lien on the obligor’s real estate.26 Second, in property 
law, the court of Equity can read an absolute deed as a mortgage.27 The judge 
has broad equitable powers and equitable discretion in a mortgage foreclosure 
sale.28 For example, a Montana court found the inherent equitable discretion to 
                                                        
20  Id. at 925. 
21  Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1005 
(2015). 
22  VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:1; see also W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Common-Law and Eq-
uity Pleading in Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 77, 77 (2006); Simon H. Scott III & W. Ever-
ett Lupton, Announcing a New Virginia “Civil” Union: The Marriage of Chancery and Law, 
VA. LAW., Feb. 2006, at 34, 35. 
23  Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 703 (2011). 
24  Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 n.26 (1949); see also Petrella v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1973–74 (2014). 
25  Runyan v. Pac. Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 688 (Cal. 1970). 
26  Canavos v. Canavos, 139 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Va. 1965). 
27  Douglas Rendleman, Absolute Conveyance as a Mortgage in Iowa, 18 DRAKE L. REV. 
197, 197 (1969); In re Primes, 518 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
28  Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 290 (1907); JOHN RAO ET AL., FORECLOSURES: 
MORTGAGE SERVICING, MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS, AND FORECLOSURE DEFENSE § 16.2.3 
(2012); David A. Super, Defending Mortgage Foreclosures: Seeking a Role for Equity, 43 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 104 (2009). 
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set the deficiency judgment in a foreclosure sale at debt minus fair market val-
ue.29 
“[M]emories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical re-
finements, recede further into the past.”30 Much of non-statutory substantive 
equity has fallen out of the law school curriculum. These losses include basic 
distinctions between law and equity and important equitable property inter-
ests.31 The profession risks losing these distinctions and doctrines altogether. 
Professor Andrew Kull deplored the “travesty” that equitable discretion over-
rode forgotten equitable property interests.32 
Features of formerly Chancery procedure are discovery, the class action, 
the shareholder’s derivative action, and interpleader. These features are part of 
modern merged civil procedure.33 Although many equitable defenses like ille-
gality, duress, and fraud were assimilated into the merged court systems, two 
equitable defenses—laches34 and unclean hands—persist, as we will see below, 
uneasily unmerged. The litigants’ constitutional jury right requires that part of 
procedure to remain unmergeable. 
This article’s treatment of merger like its treatment of discretion is particu-
larized and eclectic. The dual courts of Common Law and Chancery were a his-
torical accident that defies a logical explanation.35 Scholars of merger whose 
views have influenced mine vary in their approaches. Professor Lionel Smith 
emphasizes that, in some respects, complete merger is premature because 
“common law and Equity remain fundamentally and substantively different.”36 
Professor Douglas Laycock and others advocate, or hope for, complete mer-
                                                        
29  Trs. of the Wash.-Idaho-Mont. Carpenters-Emp’rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P’ship, 780 
P.2d 608, 619 (Mont. 1989). 
30  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
31  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1, note e (2011); An-
drew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 939, 939–
40 (2012). 
32  Andrew Kull, Ponzi, Property, and Luck, 100 IOWA L. REV. 291, 300 (2014). 
33  WORTHINGTON, supra note 10, at 327. For discussions of judicial discretion that are not 
uniquely equitable discretion in procedure joinder and aggregate litigation, see Edward 
Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation Poli-
cies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 297 n.115 (1991); Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making 
in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. REV. 683 (2014). Additional areas of procedural discretion 
are changes of venue, extensions of time, amendments of pleadings, evidence rulings, and 
setting aside default judgments. Spindle, supra note 13, at 147. 
34  Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1973–74 (2014). 
35  OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 50–51, 55–58 (1978). 
36  Lionel Smith, Common Law and Equity in R3RUE, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1185, 1187 
(2011); see also GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND TRUSTS 25 (2012). Both 
scholars emphasize trusts; the express trust with a fiduciary duty based on divided legal and 
equitable title remains a major part of substantive equity where the Chancellor has no equi-
table discretion. Smith, supra, at 1195. 
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ger.37 Although my sympathies lie with the latter group, complete merger of 
United States federal and state systems founders when we consider the liti-
gants’ jury rights at common law, but not equity, and statutes that call for equi-
table remedies. Among substance, procedure, and remedies, procedure is the 
most merged, remedies the least. 
The Big Three equitable remedies are the injunction, the constructive trust, 
and specific performance. Other equitable remedies include an equitable ac-
counting, the resulting trust, rescission-restitution, subrogation, and the judg-
ment debtor’s examination.38 Many statutes call for “equitable” relief. An ex-
ample is the frequently-litigated Employee Retirement Income Security Act.39 
Like litigants’ constitutional jury right, a statute that calls for an “equitable 
remedy” is unmergeable.40 These remedies and remedial statutes feature the 
earmarks of equity: lack of a jury, an in personam order enforced by contempt 
instead of impersonal collection, and equitable discretion. 
Legal and equitable remedies take different procedural tracks. A plaintiff’s 
lawsuit for damages, the principal common-law remedy, won’t consider Rule 
65 or Rule 60(b)(5). A lawsuit for an injunction won’t consider jury instruc-
tions, Rule 51. In that sense, remedies aren’t transsubstantive. 
Complete merger has not happened despite the persuasive call for total 
merger and functional remedies.41 Substantive areas retain their equitable ori-
gins. Administering the constitutional right to a civil jury and statutes that pre-
scribe equitable remedies require attention to law-equity distinctions. 
Observers feared that equitable discretion would be lost after merger. “Per-
haps most significantly, equitable tribunals either disappeared or lost much of 
their jurisdiction to hidebound common law courts whose traditions valued 
technical rules over substantive justice.”42 However, equitable discretion per-
sists after merger. Professor Samuel Bray has observed that the present Su-
preme Court didn’t get the memo that Law and Equity were merged.43 In deci-
sions that he refers to as “New Equity,” the Supreme Court has preserved the 
law-equity line.44 
                                                        
37  Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 
53, 78; see also WORTHINGTON, supra note 10, at 325; Andrew Burrows, We Do This at 
Common Law But That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). 
38  WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 103 (2d ed. 1956) (listing equi-
table remedies). 
39  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)(B) (2012). Professor Bray lists statutes that specify equitable re-
lief. Bray, supra note 21, at 17–18 nn.76, 78. 
40  Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002); Bray, supra 
note 21, at 4 n.9. 
41  See Laycock, supra note 37. 
42  David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1844 n.460; see also 
RALPH A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 50–51 (1961). 
43  Bray, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
44  Id. at 55. 
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The second Exhibit A reveals excessive equitable discretion. The class ac-
tion originated in equity.60 The Exhibit is Judge Weinstein’s justification to 
transfer the class action Rule’s power to approve attorney fees to the settlement 
of a non-class action: “While the settlement in the instant action is in the nature 
of a private agreement between individual plaintiffs and the defendant, it has 
many of the characteristics of a class action; it may be characterized properly as 
a quasi-class action subject to the general equitable power of the court.”61 Al-
though the judge’s statement advanced his beneficial goal of protecting claim-
ants, it arrogates equitable discretion and creativity, in effect, to make the law 
up as it goes along. As Professor Linda Mullenix wrote, “The label quasi-class 
action is a convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless administration of 
aggregate claims.”62 Reciting a conjuration doesn’t transmogrify it to law. But 
“[i]t is almost as if repeated incantation of a phrase can bring an avatar into ac-
tuality.”63 
What does this article mean by equitable discretion? What are the princi-
ples of confinement that reduce abuse but allow the judge to exercise her equi-
table discretion? 
First, what do we mean by “equitable”? Out of many definitions of “equi-
ty,” we select three to discuss: First, the institution, the Court of Equity, which 
we capitalize and often refer to as Chancery. Second, equitable remedies, chief-
ly the injunction, but sometimes specific performance or the constructive trust. 
Equity as fairness is the third part of our analysis as the discussion above 
shows. 
Unfortunately, “discretion” lacks a fixed meaning in the professional ver-
nacular.64 My meaning is narrower than that of others. Some definitions include 
decisions of arbitrary personal whim that do not involve reference to any stand-
ard or principle, for example, “red or white?” I don’t include these decisions 
under discretion. Professor Graham Virgo wrote, “[w]hilst the role of judicial 
discretion involves a choice and is essential to ensure that justice is achieved, if 
the resort to justice is to be defensible and predictable, there needs to be identi-
fiable principles or recognised factors to guide that discretion and to ensure that 
                                                        
60  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.20 (6th ed. 2011); Edward F. 
Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in For-
eign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132–33 (2003). 
61  In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y 2006). 
62  Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 
389 (2011); see also Howard M. Erichson, Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antipro-
ceduralism, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 419 (2015). 
63  Id. at 398. A more benign view of equitable discretion and class-action judges’ ability to 
invent the law is David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und 
Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 600–02 (2013). 
64  Brunet, supra note 33, at 298. 
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like cases are treated alike, for the benefit of the parties, their advisers and, if 
the case goes to trial, the judge.”65 
Many scholars include two matters under the head of discretion: first, the 
development of the law, for example, whether to reverse or extend a common 
law precedent; and, second, interpretation—the meaning of a contract, will, 
statute, or constitution.66 I consider these decisions to be law-creation that 
comes under the head of judicial wisdom and judgment, responsibly exercised, 
not discretion.67 Also, supposing distinctions between the fuzzy margins of 
fact, mixed questions of law and fact, factfinding isn’t discretionary.68 
Discretion, narrowed to equitable discretion, is the judge’s responsible 
choice in matters labeled “equitable.” In the course of litigation, many deci-
sions must be made. Those clearly governed by a rule aren’t discretionary. At 
the other end of the continuum, some decisions cannot be determined in ad-
vance by a rule because there is no clear right or wrong. Legislators, rulemak-
ers, and earlier courts cannot formulate a rule, but they can identify factors and 
formulate guidelines or standards. Factors, standards, or guidelines may exist, 
but without any clear definition of their relative importance. These identify the 
questions the judge must ask to focus her judgment on the critical issues with-
out forcing her answer.69 Context is crucial, as Roscoe Pound put it, “for put-
ting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true posi-
tion as an instrument.”70 An “equitable” element of ethical override at the 
margin will allow the judge to suppress sharp practice, form over substance, 
and opportunism.71 As Professor Graham Virgo put it, equity “has a distinct 
identity and function to modify the rigours of the Common Law.”72 
Equitable discretion requires the judge to choose between conflicting val-
ues, for example, between Rule 1’s “just” and its “speedy.” In Smith v. Com-
monwealth, a Virginia court wrote, “An ideal system of laws would be one in 
which speedy justice is administered, but justice not speed should be its para-
mount purpose.”73 The system delegates to the judge on the spot the authority 
                                                        
65  Graham Virgo, Whose Conscience? Unconscionability in the Common Law of Obliga-
tions 25 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
66  Effron, supra note 33, at 695 n.35; Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: 
The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); H. L. A. 
Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652 (2013); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 546. 
67  Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS 
L. J. 231, 253–54, 274–75 (1990) (arguing that jurisprudential discretion is not discretion). 
68  Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appel-
late Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 657 (1988). 
69  Hart, supra note 66, at 652. 
70  Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 610 (1908). 
71  Henry Smith, Equity as Second-Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism 42–43  
(Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 15-13, 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2617413. 
72  VIRGO, supra note 36. 
73  Spindle, supra note 13, at 148 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 156 S.E. 577, 579 (Va. 
1931)). 
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or equitable discretion to choose, and it trusts the judge to make a responsible 
choice, albeit one that the rule doesn’t compel. 
Trial judges’ on-the-spot decisions won’t always serve justice. Professor 
Charles Yablon’s thoughtful article on discretion cites only two examples of 
equitable discretion, both leading to lawless decisions.74 What principles of 
confinement curb the excess of equitable discretion and prevent abuse? The 
principles, Graham Virgo wrote, that supply a judge’s normative anchor 
have emerged over time through the constant evolution of Equity. Such princi-
ples are typically founded on what the judge considers to be just and fair, not de-
termined through the exercise of arbitrary choice, but rather as an external nor-
mative standard against which the defendant can be judged. Some of these 
equitable principles can be identified at a high-level of abstraction, such as fair 
dealing, trust and confidence, but then various sub-branches can be identified 
from these principles, often influenced by the particular context.75 
Two of these are below: statements of reasons and appellate review. In the 
end, a great deal depends on the decisionmaker judge’s professional standards. 
As Professor Tim Dare put it: 
No matter how carefully we construct our systems of rules and principles, cases 
inevitably arise in which we are unsure which rule applies, in which we want to 
make an exception to an applicable rule, or in which we think an apparently in-
applicable rule should after all be applied in a particular case. In such cases, 
judgement or practical wisdom is required if we are to obtain the benefit of gen-
eral rules and principles without paying the considerable costs threatened by 
their mindless application.76 
Many of the functional reasons to treat equitable and legal remedies differ-
ently stem from in personam equitable remedies, granting and enforcing the 
judge’s personal order to the defendant. As California Justice Newman put it in 
his dissent in C&K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel, “the typically 
more continuing and more personalized involvement of the trial judge in spe-
cific performance and injunctive decrees than in mere judgments for damag-
es.”77 Professor Henry McClintock wrote, “practical experience has shown that 
in the administration of specific relief there must be more discretion vested in 
the judge than in the allowance of money damages for the injury suffered. . . . 
[B]y the great weight of authority, equity still has discretion in adjusting the re-
lief to be awarded to the needs of the fact situation.”78 
Where does this leave us? The definition and operation of discretion will 
remain contested and elusive. It is difficult to distinguish discretion from other 
decisionmaking. Judge Paul Finn quoted Justice Gummow in Grimaldi v. Cha-
                                                        
74  Yablon, supra note 67, at 275–77 nn.156, 163. 
75  Virgo, supra note 65 (footnote omitted); see also Yablon, supra note 67, at 256. 
76  TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE 
LAWYER’S ROLE 155–56 (2009). 
77  C & K Eng’g v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1143 (Cal. 1978) (Newman, J., dissent-
ing). 
78  HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 51 (2d ed. 1948). 
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meleon Mining: “As Gummow J has indicated (extra-curially), this is not to 
suggest that ‘the course of decision has rendered discretion in equity so settled 
as to make it appropriate to speak of “rights” to particular remedies.’ ”79 Discre-
tion isn’t a single subject, as Moses Maimonides wrote in The Guide for the 
Perplexed, “[m]y object in adopting this arrangement is that the truths should 
be at one time apparent, and at another time concealed.”80 
II. THE STAGES OF EQUITABLE DISCRETION 
A. Quick March Through a Lawsuit 
A chronological survey of a hypothetical plaintiff’s action for an injunction 
against a feedlot’s odiferous pollution reveals equitable discretion at numerous 
points. A farmer, doing business as the Field Family Farm, is suing BeefCo, an 
out-of-state corporation that maintains an industrial feedlot next door—a 
neighbor but not a friend. Plaintiff Field alleges the tort of private nuisance be-
cause BeefCo’s feeding and finishing five thousand or more steers produces an 
odor that makes normal farm life impossible. He asks the court to grant an in-
junction to suppress the nuisance in the future, plus damages for past indigni-
ties.81 The resident farmer sues the out-of-state corporate defendant in federal 
court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction (the same procedural analysis would ex-
ist in a state court in a state that that has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, with an exception for possible state jury-trial variations). This arti-
cle will follow Field’s lawsuit with variations through the stages of a lawsuit. 
Although it focuses on trial Judge Pepper’s equitable discretion, the article 
wraps up with an appeal and collection of a money judgment. 
1. Pleading, Motions, Discovery 
The parties’ pleading and pleading motions don’t differ much from an ac-
tion for damages.82 Field’s complaint against BeefCo for an injunction will al-
lege the prerequisites for an injunction, inadequate remedy at law, irreparable 
injury, and favorable balances of hardship and the public interest. The plain-
tiff’s demand asks for an injunction, interlocutory and permanent, as well as 
compensatory damages and punitive damages. The absence of a jury for an eq-
uitable remedy may affect some of the parties’ discovery, summary judgment, 
                                                        
79  Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No. 2) (2012), 200 FCR 296, 403 (Austl.). 
80  MOSES MAIMONIDES, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3 (M. Friedläender trans., 4th rev. ed., 
1904); Yablon, supra note 67, at 253–54. 
81  See Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 761 (8th Cir. 2006). 
82  I agree with Steve and Thom’s critique of the regressive direction that personal jurisdic-
tion, pleading, discovery, summary judgment, and jury trial have taken in procedure’s Fourth 
Era. I wondered why I haven’t enjoyed my Civil Procedure course as much as I did earlier in 
my career until I read their article and others they cite. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. 
Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
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and tactical decisions, but Field is also demanding damages. We return to the 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction below. 
2. Substantive Law 
As is true with much of the substantive law leading to an equitable remedy, 
the substantive doctrine of nuisance is imprecise, hinging as it does on the de-
fendant’s unreasonable use of its property.83 Similarly, a plaintiff’s claim for an 
injunction to stop plaintiffs’ vote denial under the Voting Rights Act’s section 
2, is a “totality of the circumstances” test that requires the plaintiff to show a 
discriminatory burden on the protected class linked to “social and historical 
conditions” that produce discrimination.84 
Imprecise and vague substantive law facilitates the judge’s discretionary 
decisionmaking.85 For Professor Tobias Wolff, discretion starts when the rules 
become “indeterminate.”86 Lord Neuberger’s speech in New Zealand relates the 
discussion in the United Kingdom about whether to retain the property-based 
institutional constructive trust or to adopt the remedial constructive trust, a de-
bate that hinges on whether to accede to the remedial constructive trust’s em-
phasis on equitable discretion.87 
3. Place of Trial 
While it’s unlikely in the real world that the defendant, who owns property 
and allegedly used that property to commit a tort in the same county as the 
plaintiff, will seek forum non conveniens dismissal, suppose it does. Under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, the judge has discretion to shed a lawsuit be-
cause another forum is more appropriate.88 A judge may dismiss a legal or eq-
uitable lawsuit even though her court has jurisdiction and proper venue because 
the appropriate place of trial is elsewhere. This high-discretion doctrine came to 
us from the court’s inherent power, which we claim for equity.89 
The judge will evaluate a vague, subjective, and contextual nonexclusive 
list of public and private factors: hardship, inconvenience, choice of law, col-
                                                        
83  2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 401 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter DOBBS ET 
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS]. 
84  League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239, 243 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
85  See R. Grant Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 240, 272 (1980). 
86  Wolff, supra note 47, at 1940 n.224. 
87  Lord Neuberger, The Remedial Constructive Trust—Fact or Fiction, Address at the Bank-
ing Servs. & Fin. Law Ass’n Conference, Queenstown (Aug. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140810.pdf. 
88  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947). 
89  Id. at 509. 
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lection, and the burden on jurors, the court, and the budget.90 Returning to our 
hypothetical, Judge Pepper’s decision on BeefCo’s forum non conveniens mo-
tion is a no-brainer. She will deny it because a domestic plaintiff, not forum 
shopping, sued an out-of-state corporate defendant whose business is located in 
the forum, forum law governs, local witnesses will testify, and the defendant’s 
forum realty is available for collection. 
4. Interlocutory Equitable Relief 
Farmer Field, who alleges that BeefCo’s feedlot has driven him from his 
home, moves for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction decision 
is a fertile field for the judge’s equitable discretion.91 “[T]he award of an inter-
locutory injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as strictly a 
matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the 
plaintiff,” said the Supreme Court.92 Although the Rules provide for the prelim-
inary injunction’s little brother, the temporary restraining order,93 they leave the 
procedure and standard for a preliminary injunction mostly at large for the 
courts’ common law development.94 
The court-made standard for a preliminary injunction requires the judge to 
consider several factors: the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on final 
hearing as well as his lack of an adequate remedy at law, irreparable injury, 
balancing the hardships, and the public interest. Because of the absence of ple-
nary procedure, a judge may be less willing to grant a plaintiff an interlocutory 
injunction than a permanent injunction that followed full procedure.95 
In addition to the factors included in the standard, two principles of con-
finement circumscribe the trial judge’s latitude. First, the Rule tells the judge to 
respond to the plaintiff’s motion for an interlocutory injunction with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, on the record or written.96 Second, the losing party 
may appeal the federal judge’s preliminary injunction decision.97 
                                                        
90  Id. at 507; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Renyo, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981); Donald Earl Chil-
dress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1528–35 (2013). 
91  Cravens, supra note 15, at 974–84. 
92  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 439–40 (1944) (stating that a judge’s decision to 
grant a plaintiff a preliminary injunction is “discretionary,” and not a matter of “right”); see 
also R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
93  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2951 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing temporary restraining orders). 
94  Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1572 
(2003). 
95  DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §2.11(2) (2d ed. 
1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES]; JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING 
REMEDIES §33.2 (3d ed. 2014); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY 
RULE 111–17 (1991). 
96  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(2). This article discusses reasons for a judge’s final decision below. 
97  28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). 
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The judge’s preliminary injunction discretion, Professor Yablon wrote, is 
specialized discretion.98 The trial judge’s decision is perforce tentative because 
it is based on incomplete information and made under conditions of uncertain-
ty. Then appellate courts examines whether the trial judge’s decision was “good 
enough” under the circumstances of limited information and time.99 
Of the judge’s equitable discretion in the preliminary injunction standard, 
then-Professor Grant Hammond wrote: 
A discretionary formula, though fashionable, raises the dangers of potential ju-
dicial arbitrariness with respect to a remedy which is often dispositive of litiga-
tion and the difficulties of mounting an appeal from a discretion. These difficul-
ties are not really solved by assuming that there will always be a succession of 
level-headed men called judges on the Clapham omnibus who will exercise con-
sidered judgment.100 
The prerequisites for a preliminary injunction are factors that the appellate 
court can administer. For example, in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to stop the Navy’s use of 
sonar off the California coast because it allegedly interfered with pods of 
whales migrating through the neighboring water. The Supreme Court reversed 
the lower courts’ preliminary injunction maintaining that both lower courts had 
accorded insufficient weight to the public interest part of the preliminary in-
junction standard. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized that, under the 
public interest inquiry, the lower courts’ insufficient consideration of the public 
interest in national defense was an abuse of discretion.101 The Chief Justice’s 
concurring opinion implemented his earlier statement that the court’s discretion 
might be structured by standards.102 
Professors Sarah Cravens and Edward Cooper make the point that the fac-
tors are imprecise and subjective.103 My own view is that the Supreme Court 
majority in Winter over-weighted military training within the public interest 
factor and de-emphasized environmental concerns. However, making findings 
on the factors structures the judge’s decision, focuses her judgment on the im-
portant issues, and provides a basis for appellate review. The judge’s prelimi-
nary injunction decision has attracted serious scholarly attention.104 
                                                        
98  Yablon, supra note 67, at 268. 
99  Id. at 268–74. 
100  Hammond, supra note 85. 
101  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 26–32 (2008). The Chief Justice’s 
opinion also held that the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” standard for irreparable injury was too 
relaxed; thus the plaintiff’s irreparable injury must be likely. Cravens, supra note 15, at 981–
82. 
102  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394–95 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., con-
curring). 
103  Cravens, supra note 15, at 975; see also Cooper, supra note 68. 
104  See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficien-
cy, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381 (2005); Joshua P. Davis, 
Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363 (2003); 
Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal 
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Applying this to this article’s running hypothetical, Judge Pepper, the trial 
judge grants farmer Field a “standards” preliminary injunction that limits the 
number of steers on BeefCo’s lot to two thousand. 
5. Injunction Bond 
Judge Pepper has granted plaintiff Field a preliminary injunction that limits 
defendant BeefCo’s feedlot to two thousand steers pending discovery and a lat-
er plenary evidentiary hearing. That preliminary injunction, the defendant ar-
gues, will reduce its profits; if the preliminary injunction turns out to be incor-
rect, it should recover those profits. 
A plaintiff who receives an interlocutory injunction, a temporary restrain-
ing order or a preliminary injunction, posts a bond for the benefit of the de-
fendant should the order turn out to be incorrect.105 The judge’s equitable dis-
cretion throughout the injunction-bond process is less structured than at other 
stages of the injunction process. It resembles a sliding scale.106 The judge’s de-
cision points on the bond include discretion to waive the bond altogether, dis-
cretion to set a small or nominal bond, discretion to reject a defendant’s recov-
ery on the bond, and discretion to set the amount of the defendant’s recovery on 
the bond. 
Many courts had read the original injunction-bond Rule’s apparently man-
datory “shall” to nevertheless grant a judge equitable discretion to dispense 
with security for an indigent plaintiff.107 Other courts said that the judge has 
discretion not to require an injunction bond for a plaintiff suing in the “public 
interest.”108 Some courts found that the “public interest” militated against a 
bond because it was particularly strong when the plaintiff was seeking to vindi-
cate a constitutional right.109 The Rules-restyling project in 2007 replaced 
“shall” because it is ambiguous.110 The restylers replaced the injunction bond 
rule’s “shall” with “only if.”111 It remains to be seen whether the courts that 
                                                                                                                                
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495 (2003); James M. Fischer, “Preliminarily” Enjoining Elec-
tions: A Tale of Two Ninth Circuit Panels, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1647 (2004); Jean-Philippe 
Groleau, Interlocutory Injunctions: Revisiting the Three-Pronged Test, 53 MCGILL L.J. 269 
(2008); Hammond, supra note 85, at 278; John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In De-
fense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2007); Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the 
Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 197 (2003); Lea B. Vaughn, A Need for 
Clarity: Toward a New Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 68 OR. L. REV. 839, 848 
(1989). 
105  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
106  See, e.g., Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 444 F.3d 59, 67 n.6 (1st Cir. 
2006). 
107  Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, 2005 WL 2671289, at *6–7 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 
2005). 
108  Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995). 
109  Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 128–29 (D. 
Mass. 2003). 
110  FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note. 
111  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
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earlier found “shall” not to be mandatory will also find that “only if” allows 
discretion to grant an unbonded interlocutory injunction. 
The Rule allows the judge to set “security in an amount the court considers 
proper to pay the costs and damages” an incorrectly-enjoined defendant sus-
tains.112 Judges have claimed discretion to set a nominal bond for a public in-
terest plaintiff.113 This de-emphasizes the Rule’s standard that the bond should 
compensate the defendant’s losses. One court said that a judge setting the 
amount of an injunction bond should consider several factors: possible harm to 
the defendant, the plaintiff’s chance of ultimate success on the merits, the plain-
tiff’s ability to post the bond, and the bond’s effect on enforcement of the plain-
tiff’s rights.114 
In environmental litigation, plaintiffs often seek to enjoin huge construc-
tion projects. Requiring an injunction bond for such a preliminary injunction 
would be so expensive that it may prevent the plaintiffs’ suit. Judges claim eq-
uitable discretion in setting the amount of the bond. One judge, for example, set 
nominal bonds—$1.115 Another judge used his discretion to reduce a govern-
ment request of up to $2,500,000 per month to $100 total.116 A third bonded a 
$387,000,000 project for $1.117 “[T]he federal courts,” a student note conclud-
ed, “are returning to an equity conception of the bond determination. In so do-
ing, courts are assuming broad discretion to except applicants from bonding re-
quirements whenever their imposition would block litigation calculated to 
advance the public interest.”118 
In Bragg v. Robertson, a lawsuit we will return to later, Judge Haden 
claimed discretion to bond a preliminary injunction halting mountain-top-
removal coal mining at $5,000. The judge couldn’t dispense with a bond under 
his Court of Appeals’ precedent, but he “possesses significant discretion in set-
ting the amount of the bond.”119 
A relevant related subject is the discretion a judge exercises in setting the 
amount of a defendant’s supersedes bond to appeal a money judgment. A fed-
eral judge has discretion in setting this amount, but the judge’s discretion is 
confined by a list of factors for her to consider in setting the bond.120 These fac-
                                                        
112  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
113  Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002). 
114  Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, 
Warehousemen, & Packers, 679 F.2d 978, 1000 & n.25 (1st Cir. 1982). 
115  Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 925 F.2d 385, 386–87 nn.1, 3 (11th Cir. 1991). 
116  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167, 168–69 (D.D.C. 1971). 
117  Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of the U.S. Army, 331 F. Supp. 925, 927 
(D.D.C. 1971). 
118  Reina Calderon, Note, Bond Requirements Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c): 
An Emerging Equitable Exemption for Public Interest Litigants, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 125, 148 (1985). 
119  Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635, 652 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). 
120  Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Re-
form, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1100 (2006); Jesse Wenger, Comment, The Applicability of 
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tors are too often absent from the judge’s consideration of an injunction bond’s 
amount. 
In the article’s hypothetical case, Field’s anti-feedlot lawsuit’s land-use and 
environmental features lead Judge Pepper to consider the “public interest” and 
to exercise her discretion to bond Field’s preliminary injunction at $1,000, a 
sum that is probably inadequate to compensate BeefCo for losses if the inter-
locutory preliminary injunction turns out to be incorrect. 
After an interlocutory injunction turned out to be incorrect, one judge dis-
cussed the defendant’s recovery from the plaintiff’s injunction bond: 
[T]he court in considering the matter of damages was exercising its equity pow-
ers, and was bound to effect justice between the parties, avoiding any result that 
would be inequitable or oppressive for either party. The Rule was not intended 
to negate the court’s duty in this regard. Thus, we hold that the court had discre-
tion to refuse to award damages, in the interest of equity and justice.121 
In that case, “equity and justice” meant that the defendant, who suffered 
losses because of an incorrect order, was uncompensated, or, in law-students’ 
vernacular, sucked it up. 
Judge Posner disagreed with that court’s “open-ended” discretion. Al-
though he said in dicta that the judge has discretion to reverse a preliminary in-
junction and decline to award the defendant damages on the plaintiff’s injunc-
tion bond, he confined that discretion by requiring the trial judge to give a 
“good reason” to refuse the defendant’s recovery.122 
A Delaware court’s approach to the defendant’s recovery on the plaintiff’s 
injunction bond begins with a presumption that favors the defendant’s recov-
ery.123 The court then listed “objective factors” that might support the chancel-
lor’s decision to deny recovery: the “parties’ resources, defendants’ actions that 
cause material or unreasonable delay, defendants’ efforts or lack of effort to 
mitigate damages, and changes in applicable law after a preliminary injunction 
has issued,” as well as a finding that defendant engaged in unfair or inequitable 
conduct during the course of litigation.124 “Each case must be assessed on its 
own merits . . . and the court must be ever mindful of the presumption in favor 
of awarding [the defendant] damages” on the plaintiff’s injunction bond.125 
If the defendant recovers on the plaintiff’s injunction bond, questions 
abound. For what? And how much? May the defendant recover only damages 
                                                                                                                                
State Appeal Bond Caps in Suits Brought in Federal Courts Pursuant to Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 979, 986 (2014). 
121  Page Commc’ns Eng’rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
122  Coyne-Delany Co. v. Capital Dev. Bd. of Ill., 717 F.2d 385, 391–93 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Note, Recovery for Wrongful Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c), 99 HARV. L. REV. 
828, 842–46 (1986). 
123  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1225 (Del. 1999). 
124  Id. (quoting Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. C.A. 9700, 1998 WL 474195, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 3, 1998)). 
125  Id. (discussing Coyne-Delany Co., 717 F.2d 385). 
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to compensate loss, or also restitution measured by the plaintiff’s gain?126 Will 
recovery include the defendant’s emotional distress for example for loss of free 
speech rights? The law is thin. One example is a disappointed Alabama car 
buyer who had excoriated the automobile dealer on a website.127 The buyer was 
preliminarily enjoined.128 During the injunction period, the dealer’s lawyer 
threatened to have the defendant buyer “jailed and/or fined for contempt.”129 
After dissolving the preliminary injunction, the judge, in addition to $766.45 of 
out-of-pocket defense costs, awarded the customer $4,000 for mental anguish 
and $2,000 for loss of free speech rights from the dealer’s $10,000 injunction 
bond.130 
6. Equitable Defenses 
The equitable defenses of laches131 and unclean hands132 defy precise defi-
nition. 
a. Laches 
“Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” The 
court-made laches rules require both the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay and the 
defendant’s prejudice.133 These imprecise factors and the judge’s discretion 
create individualized, flexible, and contextual decisions. On the other hand, the 
statute of limitations that governs damages litigation is a fixed period, ostensi-
bly a rigid and arbitrary all-or-nothing rule. Laches is an extreme example of 
substituting discretion and individual justice for a fixed rule. 
Returning to the article’s hypothetical, suppose Field waited seven years to 
sue BeefCo. He is demanding damages in addition to an injunction. 
Laches and the statute of limitations may both apply in the same lawsuit.134 
When a plaintiff seeks legal and equitable remedies, either together or in the 
alternative, laches may bar the equitable relief, but leave the plaintiff free to 
pursue his legal remedy within the statute of limitations period.135 One court, 
for example, denied plaintiffs specific performance because of their laches but 
                                                        
126  Ofer Grosskopf & Barak Medina, Remedies for Wrongfully-Issued Preliminary Injunc-
tions: The Case for Disgorgement of Profits, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 903, 929–34 (2009). 
127  Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Ballock, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1257–58 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
128  Id. at 1258. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 1258–59. 
131  RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 250–68; DOUG RENDLEMAN & 
CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 390–401 (8th ed. 2011). 
132  RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 268–71; RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, 
supra note 131, at 384–90. 
133  Lake Dev. Enters., Inc. v. Kojetinsky, 410 S.W.2d 361, 367–68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966). 
134  Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities, Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 234 (6th Cir. 2007). 
135  See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584–85 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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nevertheless awarded them expectancy damages for the defendants’ breach of 
contract.136 
The Supreme Court’s 2014 laches decision, Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, involved plaintiff’s copyright in a screenplay for the movie, “Raging 
Bull.”137 The Court held that where each of defendant’s copyright infringe-
ments starts a new limitations period, laches doesn’t bar plaintiff’s relief for de-
fendant’s alleged infringement within that statutory period.138 Plaintiff’s eight-
een-year delay in suing would not block her claim to recover defendant’s 
profits, an equitable remedy, the Court said, for defendant’s infringements 
within the limitations period.139 The majority also said that plaintiff would be 
entitled to an injunction to forbid defendant’s future infringement.140 By infer-
ence from the majority opinion, equitable relief, an accounting for disgorge-
ment of defendant’s profits that occurred outside the statute of limitations peri-
od, is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.141 According to the dissent, 
however, which cites Aristotle, laches apparently applies when the plaintiff 
seeks equitable relief, an injunction only, or an accounting only, for the defend-
ant’s alleged infringement outside the statute of limitations.142 
Courts claim discretion in applying laches.143 In 1956, Professor William 
de Funiak wrote: 
[A] court of equity may refuse relief on the ground of laches although the pur-
suit of a legal remedy on the same cause would not be barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations, or it may grant relief after the bar of the statute of limita-
tions has been raised against the legal remedy. The discretion of the court, in 
view of the circumstances of the case, is freely exercised.144 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer an-
swered neither of de Funiak’s questions. It didn’t address his first point at all, 
and the majority and dissent disagree about the majority’s decision on the sec-
ond question. Confusion competes with equitable discretion in clouding our 
clear view of laches.145 
Despite the Supreme Court’s confusion, it seems that, if the statute of limi-
tations begins to run anew on each day of a defendant’s temporary or continu-
                                                        
136  Estate of Younge v. Huysmans, 506 A.2d 282, 285–86 (N.H. 1985). 
137  Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014). 
138  Id. at 1969. 
139  Id. at 1971, 1973. 
140  Id. at 1979. 
141  Id. at 1973. 
142  Id. at 1979–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
143  Gardner v. Pan. R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1951); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 
253, 257 (1877); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 552 
(1862). 
144  DE FUNIAK, supra note 38, § 24 (footnote omitted). 
145  Douglas Edward Pittman, Note, Is Time Up for Equitable Relief? Examining Whether the 
Statute of Limitations Contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 Applies to Claims for Injunctive Relief, 
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2449, 2460 (2013). 
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ing nuisance, plaintiff Field’s damages action to recover damages for his losses 
during the statute of limitations period won’t be barred.146 If the plaintiff sues 
within the statute of limitations period, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pet-
rella contemplated an injunction to forbid the defendant’s future infringement. 
Although the federal rule lists laches as a defendant’s affirmative defense, 
it omits unclean hands, our second equitable defense.147 
b. Unclean Hands 
Zechariah Chafee wrote, “[t]he most amusing maxim of equity is ‘He who 
comes into Equity must come with clean hands.’ It has given rise to many in-
teresting cases and poor jokes. The maxim has been regarded as an especially 
significant manifestation of the ethical attitude of equity as contrasted with the 
common law.”148 
Chancery courts base the defendant’s unclean hands defense on the Chan-
cellor’s discretion to decline to grant a plaintiff an equitable remedy.149 “Like 
other doctrines of equity, the clean hands maxim is not a binding rule, but is to 
be applied in the sound discretion of the court. . . . In applying the unclean 
hands doctrine, courts act for their own protection, and not as a matter of ‘de-
fense’ to the defendant.”150 
Suppose Field has established a website or gripe-site to excoriate BeefCo. 
The defendant’s lawyers tell the CEO that, while not every invective on Field’s 
website is literally true, because of the public interest in pollution and the envi-
ronment, the corporation is a limited-purpose public figure that will be unlikely 
to recover for Field’s defamation.151 BeefCo interposes plaintiff’s falsehoods as 
unclean hands. 
The plaintiff’s misconduct that soils his hands may violate statutory or 
judge-made positive law; for example, it may be fraud. The risk of unconfined 
equitable discretion emerges when the judge’s broad personal version of un-
clean doesn’t coincide with positive law. Section 398 of all five editions of 
Pomeroy’s Equity treatise insisted that the Chancellor could reject a plaintiff’s 
demand for an equitable remedy because the plaintiff had done something that 
violated a principle of the judge’s conscience, although it did not violate posi-
                                                        
146  DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 83, § 404 n.18. 
147  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
148  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 1 (1950); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 
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tive law.152 “Any willful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully can 
be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the 
invocation of the maxim,” the Supreme Court wrote in 1945, “Accordingly 
one’s misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as to be pun-
ishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character.”153 In 
2008, Professor Leigh Anenson maintained that a plaintiff’s unethical or im-
proper conduct or motive may soil his hands, even when it is not contrary to 
positive law.154 In 2011, the Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment said that a plaintiff’s misconduct or unclean hands bars both legal res-
titution and equitable restitution.155 
Others have criticized the expansive view of unclean hands. “Equity does 
not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives,” observed Justice 
Brandeis.156 Critics include Judge Richard Posner.157 A judge’s opinion of mis-
conduct may be subjective, even idiosyncratic. Chafee favored the same princi-
ples in both law and equity. The judge might refuse to grant an injunction or 
specific performance for reasons related to those remedies, but not solely on the 
Chancellor’s ethical principles.158 
If the expansive view of unclean hands prevails, a contemporary judge 
might demand better behavior from a plaintiff seeking an injunction than one 
demanding damages. Under this view, plaintiff Field’s demand for an equitable 
injunction may fail because of his inaccurate, but probably not actionable, web-
site. On the other hand, should a judge be able to bar a soiled-handed plaintiff 
from recovering the legal remedy of damages? Professor Anenson follows the 
tradition above of arguing that the judge of a merged court ought to have dis-
cretion to consider a plaintiff’s unclean hands in damages actions as well as in 
Equity.159 Perhaps, if her view prevails, plaintiff Field’s damages or legal relief 
will fail as well. 
But the view that soiled hands bar a plaintiff’s legal relief is far from unan-
imous. “The unclean hands defense is not available in an action at law,” ob-
served one court.160 Professor Doug Laycock asked whether the “basic prem-
ise” of the unclean hands defense “is unsound” because it is “the same as 
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saying two wrongs make a right.”161 “If judges,” Professor Dan Dobbs wrote, 
“had the power to deny damages and other legal remedies because a plaintiff 
came into court with unclean hands, citizens would not have rights, only privi-
leges.”162 Thus, Dobbs suggested eliminating unclean hands when it is redun-
dant with another defense and requiring serious misconduct that is sufficiently 
related to the plaintiff’s claim to have, within the scope of the risk, harmed the 
defendant or the defendant’s group.163 
If Laycock’s and Dobbs’s views prevail in our hypothetical, Field’s nui-
sance action for damages and an injunction survives BeefCo’s unclean hands 
defense. 
7. Jury Trial 
There will be no jury for an equitable remedy like an injunction or specific 
performance. This contrasts with the litigants’ constitutional right to a jury in 
“suits at common law,” usually to recover the plaintiff’s compensatory damag-
es. The Seventh Amendment’s clause guaranteeing trial by jury protects liti-
gants’ right to a jury trial on questions of fact in an action at common law.164 In 
the small percentage of lawsuits that reach trial, a jury will limit the judge’s de-
cisions.165 
A non-jury or ore tenus equity trial is usually shorter, less expensive, and 
more informal. The judge will be likely to admit evidence that the evidence 
rules, designed for a jury trial, would exclude.166 The Federal Rules authors, 
Steve concluded, who favored equitable discretion and expertise, tended to 
subordinate the jury.167 Steve and Thom have shown how the more recent civil-
justice “reformers” built on that foundation in eroding what Chief Justice Burg-
er called the “dubious” Seventh Amendment.168 Further, one reason to favor 
judges over juries is that juries tend to favor plaintiffs and claimants.169 
While writing this article, I received a jury questionnaire from the clerk’s 
office. The civil jury adds community participation and community values to 
litigation. It augments adjudication’s legitimacy.170 As I wrote a few years ago: 
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The civil jury . . . reflects a fundamental paradox between authority delegated 
and authority retained. Ultimate sovereignty resides in the people. In the end, 
those who look only to results must yield to process values. Juries prevent legal-
isms from vanquishing justice. The civil jury survives, tarnished but sentient. 
Within a constitutional framework, officials possess delegated authority. Consti-
tutional government ensures that to the extent possible, people and officials live 
by the rule of law instead of the rule of a person or group of persons. Judges pro-
tect the Constitution from the people. To limit the government, we divide its 
power with the jury, but the jury may exercise that power irresponsibly. Liti-
gants seek, in particular courtrooms, to secure benefits of substantive rights to 
which all have an equal but abstract claim. The judge exercises delegated au-
thority; the jury represents retained authority. The courtroom unites dour elitism 
and zealous populism in intrinsic discord.171 
The Seventh Amendment’s trial-by-jury clause explicitly looks backward 
in time. It “preserves” the distinction between a jury trial “at Common Law” 
and a bench or ore tenus trial in Chancery that existed in the early national pe-
riod. The division between Law and Equity developed historically because of 
conditions that no longer exist; the distinction is neither logical nor functional, 
indeed it is often outright irrational.172 Lawyers and judges study and apply an 
arcane system that has faded because it was impractical and cumbersome. 
“Judges,” Justice Breyer wrote extra-judicially, “are not expert historians.”173 
In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, the Court exhumed the histori-
cal evidence on whether statutory damages for defendant’s copyright infringe-
ment were legal or equitable. It concluded that indeed they were “at common 
law,” and subject to the defendant’s jury trial right.174 Professor H. Tomás 
Gómez-Arostegui, a legal historian who specializes in copyright, examined the 
historical evidence. He concluded that the Court reached the correct result in 
Feltner; that result was not exactly “dumb luck.”175 But, because of insufficient 
research and analysis, defective citations, and misunderstanding of the histori-
cal vocabulary, the correct result was “fortuitous.”176 Courts, Professor Gómez-
Arostegui concluded, ought to either improve their legal history or give it up 
altogether.177 
The argument for the historical approach emphasizes that judges should not 
define their own jurisdiction, but that they need an external test.178 On the other 
hand, a more functional approach to the jury trial right emphasizes the remedy 
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the claimant seeks. If the plaintiff’s demand seeks in personam or personal re-
lief instead of in rem relief, the jury right isn’t present. As quoted above, Cali-
fornia Justice Newman’s dissent in C&K Engineering Contractors v. Amber 
Steel favored a jury trial because of “the typically more continuing and more 
personalized involvement of the trial judge in specific performance and injunc-
tive decrees than in mere judgments for damages.”179 
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Albemarle Paper v. Moody 
emphasized equitable discretion as the test for the litigants’ jury right: 
To the extent, then, that the District Court retains substantial discretion as to 
whether or not to award backpay notwithstanding a finding of unlawful discrim-
ination, the nature of the jurisdiction which the court exercises is equitable, and 
under our cases neither party may demand a jury trial. To the extent that discre-
tion is replaced by awards which follow as a matter of course from a finding of 
wrongdoing, the action of the court in making such awards could not be fairly 
characterized as equitable in character, and would quite arguably be subject to 
the provisions of the Seventh Amendment.180 
With respect, Rehnquist’s position seems unsound on both fronts. The liti-
gants’ jury right should not vary because of the test the fact-finder applies to 
award money; a victim of discrimination should “as a matter of course” recover 
back pay for his loss period. A jury has its discretion to set the amount of a per-
sonal injury plaintiff’s pain and suffering compensatory damages just as a 
judge has her equitable discretion to measure a plaintiff’s equitable remedy.181 
Revisiting, once again, our hypothetical, both a functional and a historical 
test lead to an equitable approach to nuisance plaintiff Field’s injunction. Since 
he seeks both money damages and an injunction, there may be a jury to decide 
defendant’s liability and plaintiff’s damages and a judge to grant or deny an in-
junction consistently with the jury’s verdict on factual issues.182 
The jury finds the facts from the admitted evidence and applies the law ar-
ticulated in the judge’s instructions. The Seventh Amendment’s second clause, 
referred to as the reexamination clause, protects a jury’s factual decision and 
verdict unless, as a matter of law, a reasonable juror couldn’t find for the pre-
vailing party.183 Because of the reexamination clause, the trial judge and later 
the appellate court review a jury’s factual decision deferentially: could a rea-
sonable juror reach the jury’s decision on the evidence? 
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However, the trial judge in equity has the power to decide factual issues 
unconstrained by a jury’s participation and, usually, the rules of evidence. One 
judge wrote that “[a]llocati[on] of the burden of proof is also left to the court’s 
discretion.”184 Evidence rules, the tradition holds, are to overcome jurors’ cog-
nitive shortcomings, leading to what Professor Frederick Schauer refers to as a 
profession “clinging to a romantic image of the trial judge as a figure largely 
free of the cognitive failings we see and appreciate in lay jurors.”185 
The judge may pay an onsite visit. In his well-known story of his role in 
the health department’s efforts to ensure healthy conditions at a “hippie” 
campground, Judge Dave Sentelle toured the Rainbow People’s campground 
before settling the parties down to negotiate a consent decree about the public 
health and safety in the area.186 Similarly, in structural litigation about a dystop-
ic residential institution, Judge Frank Johnson visited class plaintiffs.187 Before 
granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against defendants’ mountain-top-
removal coal mining in litigation discussed in this article, Judge Haden visited 
Pigeonroost Hollow and flew over other mining sites.188 Closer to home, in two 
Alabama nuisance lawsuits, two trial judges visited stock-feeding operations; 
the state Supreme Court wrote that one judge’s tour augmented his equitable 
discretion.189 These differences between a jury trial and a bench trial in equity 
will increase Judge Pepper’s discretion in adjudicating the equitable issues in 
Field’s nuisance lawsuit, should she choose to visit the neighbor’s yard, allo-
cate the burden of proof as she sees fit, and selectively heed the rules of evi-
dence. 
Steve Subrin’s opinion, however, is that a jury’s sense of community 
would temper the judge’s equitable discretion and propensity to make an arbi-
trary decision and improve the administration of justice.190 
If we have been emphasizing the equity judge’s discretion, the next sub-
ject, reason giving, militates against the judge’s unconstrained discretion. The 
jury need not explain its general verdict, which expresses its conclusion only.191 
On the other hand, Rule 52 requires a judge to give reasons in the form of find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law after a non-jury trial.192 This requirement is 
a major principle of confinement on the judge’s equitable discretion. The pro-
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cess of professional reasoning forces the judge to consider precedents, alterna-
tives, and others’ views. It enhances legitimacy by explaining to the loser why 
he lost. It should reduce the effects of prejudice and fancy, and militate against 
arbitrary results.193 
Requiring reasons is quality control because it trims the chance of unreflec-
tive, hasty, biased, and arbitrary decisions. A reason is a result taken to a higher 
level of generality and a commitment to the future. Professor Schauer wrote, 
“[r]eason-giving is therefore in tension with and potentially a check on maxi-
mal contextualization, on case-by-case determination, and on recognition of the 
power of the particular. . . . [W]hen context, case-by-case decisionmaking, and 
flexibility are thought important, the benefits of requiring decisionmakers to 
give reasons do not come without a price.”194 
Whether the requirement of reasons offsets the disadvantages of dispensing 
with the jury is a question without a fixed answer. 
8. The Equitable Remedy 
The judge’s choice of an equitable remedy has been another fertile field for 
equitable discretion. For example, the Contracts Restatement says that the 
“granting of equitable relief has traditionally been regarded as within judicial 
discretion.”195 However, one of the earliest discussions of a judge’s discretion, 
written by an experienced Virginia trial judge, did not discuss judges’ decisions 
to grant equitable remedies, injunctions, and specific performance because they 
were, he wrote, “analogous to the determination of facts without a jury.”196 
In granting an equitable remedy, we assume that the defendant has 
breached or is about to breach the plaintiff’s rights. The judge has no discretion 
to grant a remedy unless the defendant has violated or predictably will violate 
the plaintiff’s right.197 Injunctive relief is appropriate where there is a reasona-
ble likelihood that the defendant’s wrong will be repeated.198 
We begin with claims that support judges’ unlimited equitable discretion, 
as found in judicial opinions and professors’ analysis. “There are,” one judge 
wrote, “no ‘established rules and fixed principles laid down’ for the application 
of equity. Rather ‘equity depends essentially upon the particular circumstances 
of each case.’ District courts are therefore given broad discretion in modeling 
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their equity judgments.”199 Professors have identified open-ended equitable 
discretion in adjudicating injunctions against domestic violence200 and to return 
an abducted child.201 
To structure our approach to the judge’s equitable discretion at the remedi-
al stage, we will review three kinds of discretionary choices: discretion to dis-
pense with a remedy altogether, discretion to choose the remedy, and discretion 
to shape the remedy. Choice of remedy—granting an injunction or not—differs 
from shaping an injunction once granted. These are useful starting places. 
However, equitable discretion doesn’t fit into pigeonholes, but blends at the 
margins. 
The beginning point is the idealistic Maxim: “equity will not suffer a 
wrong to be without a remedy,” or “where there is a legal right, there is also a 
legal remedy,” which, in Latin, translates to “ubi jus, ubi remedium.”202 
The Supreme Court has not been completely faithful to no right without a 
remedy. In doing so, the Court has cited equitable discretion: “An injunction is 
a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as 
a matter of course.”203 In another opinion, the Court said that “a federal judge 
sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for 
every violation of law.”204 Decisions holding that the plaintiff has a right under 
substantive law but that the defendant’s violation will not lead to some kind of 
remedy should, in my judgment, be rare. In public rights litigation, for exam-
ple, under an environmental statute, the judge’s choice may be injunction or 
nothing. In private rights litigation like Field’s nuisance, the judge will more 
often choose between an injunction, an equitable remedy, and the legal reme-
dy—damages. 
In eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court separated a plaintiff’s right 
from its remedy.205 The origin of the plaintiff’s substantive right—be it consti-
tution, statute, or common law—affects the judge’s equitable discretion. A 
judge, Professor Zygmunt Plater wrote, has discretion to withhold an injunction 
when the defendant has violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.206 
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The Court’s rule of statutory construction in Hecht v. Bowles augments the 
judge’s statutory equitable discretion. The statutory “shall,” the Court held, 
didn’t eliminate the judge’s equitable discretion to decline to grant an injunc-
tion.207 “[I]f Congress desired to make such an abrupt departure from tradition-
al equity practice as is suggested, it would have made its desire plain.”208 Plater 
argued that a judge cannot refuse to enjoin when the defendant has breached a 
statute, because separation of powers forbids a judge from overriding the legis-
lature’s statute.209 
Does the judge have equitable discretion to ignore a statute or rule? The 
principles of equity, Plater maintained, do not license the judge to detour 
around a statute or procedural rule that seems to the judge to compel an unsatis-
factory result.210 “[W]hen,” a Court of Appeals wrote, “a plaintiff has prevailed 
and established the defendant’s liability under Title VII [employment discrimi-
nation], there is no discretion to deny injunctive relief completely.”211 The 
judge’s discretion is similarly circumscribed in Wage and Hour remedies.212 
After the trial judge cited “principles of equity” to ignore the statute of limita-
tions, the Montana Supreme Court reversed.213 
In environmental decisions under a statute, the judge’s choice of remedy 
will often be between an injunction and no remedy, nothing, in contrast to her 
choice between an injunction and damages for defendant’s nuisance. Professor 
Farber argued against equitable discretion under modern environmental stat-
utes.214 Courts, Farber concluded, should adopt a presumption against equitable 
discretion because the legislature has considered the factors leading to discre-
tion and a court shouldn’t upset that decision.215 Instead, in formulating an en-
vironmental remedy, a court should examine the duties that the statute creates. 
Its decision to grant or deny an injunction should turn on the type of duty and 
injunction the statute creates instead of on the court’s equitable discretion.216 
Another perceptive approach is Judge Posner’s: “The fact that a proceeding 
is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute 
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rights in accordance with his personal views of justice and fairness, however 
enlightened those views may be.”217 
The bankruptcy court’s broad equitable powers, a Court of Appeals ob-
served in 2004, “must and can only be exercised within the confines of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”218 A 2014 Supreme Court decision tests the trial judge’s 
ability to subordinate a statute that seemed to lead to a suboptimal result to 
achieve, instead, an “equitable” result.219 A bankruptcy judge overrode a bad 
faith debtor’s statutory homestead exemption; the judge cited the court’s inher-
ent power under Bankruptcy Code Section 105, an all-writs act.220 The Su-
preme Court held that the judge lacked inherent power to disregard the statute’s 
specific exemption statute.221 
Florida decisions under a state constitutional provision that protects a debt-
or’s exemptions present a sharp contrast. In Palm Beach Savings and Loan v. 
Fishbein, the husband had fraudulently obtained a loan and used the money to 
pay a mortgage on homestead property, which in turn his wife obtained in the 
couple’s divorce settlement.222 The court granted the defrauded lender an equi-
table lien—under the doctrine of equitable subrogation—on the wife’s home-
stead property in the amount of the borrowed money her ex-husband, the debt-
or, had used to pay the mortgage.223 
A court that adjudicates a remedy under the textual language in a constitu-
tion or a statute starts with an externally supplied written baseline premise that 
may circumscribe discretion. On the other hand, a court that applies the court-
made common law to a dispute not controlled by a precedent literally molds 
and creates the law as it consults existing decisions to decide the plaintiff’s 
remedy.224 A court’s common-law technique includes adjusting common-law 
rules to the unprovided, unforeseen, and changed. Plater wrote that in a lawsuit 
governed by common law rules, “abatement was decided anew in each case.”225 
The question in private nuisance litigation usually comes under the head of 
whether the plaintiff’s damages remedy is adequate; whether without an injunc-
tion he will suffer irreparable injury. The prerequisites of inadequate remedy at 
law and irreparable injury usually tell the judge to examine whether compensa-
tory damages will suffice for the plaintiff’s remedy. The Supreme Court in 
eBay v. MercExchange stated the plaintiff’s prerequisites for a permanent in-
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junction: inadequate remedy at law, irreparable injury, balancing the hardships, 
and the public interest.226 The judge’s equitable discretion guides application of 
these factors.227 I cite eBay as existing positive law, not to endorse it. I have ar-
gued elsewhere that, instead of being prerequisites for the plaintiff, the stand-
ards of inadequacy, irreparability, balancing, and the public interest should be 
affirmative defenses for the defendant.228 
Balancing the hardships and the public interest also involve comparisons. 
Namely, these are between the plaintiff and the defendant in balancing the 
hardships and between the plaintiff and the public in the public interest. One 
example illustrates both comparisons. The owners of a Portland, Oregon shop-
ping mall demanded an anti-trespass injunction to forbid canvassers in the mall 
from soliciting signatures for an initiative petition.229 Granting a property own-
er a no-trespass injunction is usually routine.230 The mall owners sought to en-
join the political activists from even entering the mall to solicit and secure sig-
natures.231 Trespass, the court said, is not always enjoined.232 The court 
emphasized equitable flexibility, discretion, balancing the hardships, and the 
public interest in the political process.233 “This court has recognized that equi-
table remedies against invasions of real property do not follow inexorably when 
a landowner seeks to deny entry. . . . But an injunction remains discretionary 
and subject to equitable considerations; it is not available as a matter of 
right.”234 The court held that while the mall could not exclude the solicitors, the 
trial judge could employ equitable discretion to shape and define a remedy to 
impose reasonable restrictions on the canvassers’ time, place, and manner.235 
The balancing the hardships or undue hardships inquiry has generated a 
large amount of literature that includes one of my contributions.236 This inquiry 
leads the court to choose between compensatory damages and an injunction, to 
which we turn. 
In our nuisance lawsuit, BeefCo, the defendant, is likely to argue for favor-
able rulings on balancing the hardships and the public interest: People need 
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beef. Feeding steers close to the corn and the terminal market will hold the con-
sumers’ price down. We employ eighteen people. We benefit consumers, farm-
ers, and truckers. And we pay lots of taxes. 
The judge choosing between remedies has leeway. The choice of reme-
dies—injunction versus damages—has been a contested issue. Because an in-
junction is preventive and constitutes in personam relief, as distinguished from 
impersonal collection of a judgment for compensatory damages, there are dif-
ferences. 
The Supreme Court wrote: 
[T]he extent to which equity will go to give relief where there is no adequate 
remedy at law is not a matter of fixed rule. It rests rather in the sound discretion 
of the court. Whether the decree will prove so useless as to lead a court to refuse 
to give it, is a matter of judgment to be exercised with reference to the special 
circumstances of each case rather than to general rules which at most are but 
guides to the exercise of discretion.237 
In the nuisance case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, the New York Court of 
Appeals approved the preceding point when it wrote that “[t]he power of the 
court to condition on equitable grounds the continuance of an injunction on the 
payment of permanent damages seems undoubted.”238 
A trial judge who evaluates the balance from BeefCo’s perspective may 
remit farmer Field to recovering permanent damages.239 On the other hand, a 
feedlot doesn’t require a large capital investment. Defendant BeefCo who ne-
glected to establish a sufficient buffer zone can move its feeding operation 
elsewhere. One well-known decision went so far as to cite equity to tell the 
plaintiff who came along after the feedlot was in place to pay the feedlot’s 
moving expenses.240 If Field was there first, we don’t recommend this solution 
to the judge, or, for that matter, to anyone. 
BeefCo’s feedlot nuisance will impose a large subjective non-pecuniary 
loss on Field and others. BeefCo may have, as a practical matter, excluded 
Field from using his property as a home. A judgment for permanent money 
damages may compensate Field for the decline in market value but ratify Beef-
Co’s pollution and the non-pecuniary loss. Observers prefer an injunction to 
force the defendant’s offensive activity “to either pay for the full losses (objec-
tive and subjective) or shut down.”241 
A judge’s injunction decision need not be all or nothing—a shutdown order 
or a damages award. A judge’s intermediate solution is a conditions injunction 
                                                        
237  Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, Ry. Emps. Dep’t of the Am. Fed’n of Labor, 300 
U.S. 515, 551 (1937) (citations omitted); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 490 (1925); Joy 
v. St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 47 (1891). 
238  Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1970). 
239  Id. at 875. 
240  Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
241  Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Ac-
tions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 65 (2010); Rendleman, supra note 236. 
Summer 2015] TRIUMPH OF EQUITY REVISITED 1431 
that eliminates, or reduces to tolerable, the defendant’s harmful activity. Judge 
Pepper’s preliminary injunction that limits BeefCo to two thousand cattle is a 
conditions injunction, perhaps an experiment for her final order. 
An example of the other side of the remedial coin is a court’s decision to 
grant an injunction but to refuse damages. In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. 
v. Novak, an anti-nuclear activist marketed t-shirts and coffee mugs bearing the 
caption “Mutant of Omaha” along with a logo that resembled Mutual of Oma-
ha’s trademark. One of the shirts read, “When the world’s in ashes, we’ll have 
you covered.” The court held that the defendant’s shirts and mugs infringed 
Mutual’s registered trademark. It enjoined the defendant from using “Mutant.” 
However, the court said, “Because the parties sell non-competing goods, and 
because the Court is satisfied that the injunction will satisfy the equities of this 
case, no further award shall be made.”242 Thus, the judge wields equitable dis-
cretion when she decides whether to grant other equitable remedies. 
While we are at it, we will summarize the trial judge’s equitable discretion 
in choosing and measuring several other equitable remedies. 
a. Receiver 
Suppose for a variation on an injunction, that Judge Pepper visits BeefCo’s 
feedlot and finds that the overcrowding is so unhealthy that it borders on viola-
tion of a cruelty-to-animals statute. If the defendant cannot be relied upon to 
clean the mess up, the judge may consider a judicial takeover of BeefCo’s feed-
lot, putting it in the control of an appointed receiver.243 Although the judge’s 
equitable discretion applies to appointment or a receiver, a “humanitarian” re-
ceiver to preserve the nonparty cattle may fail. Courts appoint receivers to pro-
tect the plaintiff who has a right of some kind in the property from a defendant 
who is endangering or mismanaging that property. Field needs to argue for a 
receiver on the premise that the unhealthy state of the herd is endangering him 
because it reduces BeefCo’s ability to pay a money judgment.244 
b. Specific Performance 
Before the merger of Law and Equity, courts were emphatic that a plain-
tiff’s demand for specific performance of a contract to sell land was subject to 
the court’s equitable discretion. 
To stay the arm of a court of equity from enforcing a contract it is by no means 
necessary to prove that it is invalid; from time to time immemorial it has been 
                                                        
242  Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 912 (D. Neb. 1986); see also El 
Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 25, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); 
RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 139. 
243  MCCLINTOCK, supra note 78, at 557–62 (discussing the appointment of receivers and the 
administration of receivership suits). 
244  W.E. Erickson Constr., Inc. v. Cong.-Kenilworth Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1209, 1211–12 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1983). A Rule 23(b)(2) class action on behalf of the steers will fail. 
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the recognized duty of such courts to exercise a discretion; to refuse their aid in 
the enforcement of unconscionable, oppressive or iniquitous contracts; and to 
turn the party claiming the benefit of such contract over to a court of law.245 
Courts seemed to approach specific performance differently after Law and 
Equity were merged. For example, when a buyer seeks to enforce a seller’s 
breached contract to buy land, a judge’s specific performance order is typical. 
The judge will consider each parcel of land to be unique, presume that damages 
for the buyer will be an inadequate remedy, and routinely order the breaching 
seller to convey the property to the buyer.246 
c. Constructive Trust 
After the injunction and specific performance, the third major equitable 
remedy is the constructive trust. The constructive trust is defined generally to 
afford judges equitable discretion to wield it when they uncover new forms of 
misconduct that merit relief.247 The restitution remedy of constructive trust in-
cludes the judge’s equitable discretion to withhold that remedy even when the 
plaintiff shows he is otherwise qualified because the constructive trust’s tracing 
feature will impose a hardship on third parties.248 
d. Salvor 
The maritime court’s restitution award for a “salvor,” who rescues anoth-
er’s craft at sea sets up a seven-factor analysis without a precise formula for the 
trial judge to calculate the salvor’s salvage award.249 The judge has sole discre-
tion to award a salvor title.250 
                                                        
245  Haffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U.S. 446, 450 (1910) (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 
144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892)); Hennessy v. Woolworth, 128 U.S. 438, 442 (1888) (citing 
Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 567 (1869)); Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. 339, 357 (1870); 
Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 565 (1869); King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. 311, 328 (1830); 
Hepburn & Dundas’ Heirs & Ex’rs v. Dunlop & Co., 14 U.S. 179, 203 n.d (1816); Buxton v. 
Lister, 26 Eng. Rep. 1020, 1022, (1746); Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1824); Simmons v. Hill, 4 H. & McH. 258 (Md. 1798); EDWARD YORIO & STEVE THEL, 
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 1.3 n.52 (2d ed. 
2014). 
246  DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra note 95, §§ 12.8(1), 12.11(3). 
247  Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 193–94 (N.Y. 1978); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55 (2011). 
248  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55, cmt. d (2011); see 
also United States v. Andrews, 530 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). 
249  R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 742 F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (E.D. 
Va. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. e, n.e 
(2011). 
250  R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 2d at 808. Title was awarded in that case. R.M.S. Ti-
tanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 804 F. Supp. 2d 508, 509 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
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e. Rescission-restitution 
The judge’s equitable discretion in equitable rescission-restitution is said to 
include whether to grant it at all. “The granting or withholding [of] rescission is 
not a matter of right but rather one of grace, and lies largely within the court’s 
discretion.”251 
f. Legal and Equitable Restitution 
The differences between Law and Equity fade when the judge chooses be-
tween legal restitution and equitable restitution. An earlier court might have 
been more influenced by the dual systems of Law and Equity. It might have 
held that a plaintiff’s money judgment for legal restitution, money had and re-
ceived, is an adequate remedy at law that prevents Chancery from granting the 
plaintiff a constructive trust.252 A contemporary court would be more likely to 
treat the choice as a more functional one and to focus on whether the plaintiff 
requires a feature of equitable restitution like the constructive trust’s tracing 
feature.253 Professor George Palmer discussed the “erosion” of the inadequacy 
test when a plaintiff who could recover legal restitution seeks an equitable rem-
edy. He noted that “[r]emedial law can be applied both more easily and more 
sensibly when courts are able to give the relief called for by the facts.”254 
g. Subrogation 
The Chancellor’s equitable discretion in the equitable remedy of subroga-
tion includes discretion to adjust measurement. In the widely cited New Jersey 
decision in Gaskill v. Wales’ Executor, the court wrote, “The principle of sub-
rogation is one of equity merely, and it will accordingly be applied only in the 
exercise of an equitable discretion, and always with a due regard to the legal 
and equitable rights of others.”255 
A United Kingdom treatise articulated the equitable discretion in subroga-
tion in common-law jurisdictions. 
                                                        
251  Bechard v. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946); see also Suburban Properties, Inc. 
v. Hanson, 382 P.2d 90, 94 (Or. 1963) (“The equitable remedy of rescission is not one en-
forceable as a matter of right . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 54, cmts. b–c (2011). 
252  Waters v. Boyden, 176 N.E. 535, 536 (Mass. 1931). 
253  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 (2011). 
254  1 GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.6 (1978). 
255  Gaskill v. Wales’ Ex’r, 36 N.J. Eq. 527, 533 (1883); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Ark. 2001); Sperry v. Butler, 53 A. 899, 900 
(Conn. 1903); Opp v. Ward, 24 N.E. 974, 975 (Ind. 1890); First Nat’l Bank v. Plante, 235 
N.W. 135, 138 (N.D. 1931); Garvin v. Garvin, 4 S.E. 148, 151 (S.C. 1887); Dixon v. Mor-
gan, 285 S.W. 558, 560–61 (Tenn. 1926); Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 
559 S.E.2d 870 (Va. 2002) (subrogation is equitable, not a strict right; it depends on facts 
and circumstances, not an all-purpose test). 
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[E]ven where the claimant’s payment is wholly responsible for discharging the 
defendant’s liability to the creditor, it does not inexorably follow that the appro-
priate measure of the defendant’s resulting liability to the claimant must be the 
whole of the liability discharged. It may only be some lesser proportion. The 
reason is that the ground of restitution on which the claimant relies may be such 
that the claimant can only demonstrate that some lesser proportion of the de-
fendant’s discharged liability to the creditor is an unjust enrichment of the de-
fendant at the claimant’s expense.256 
h. Declaratory Judgment 
A declaratory judgment is a remedy that allows the court to tell the parties 
what their rights are under the governing law.257 Although we shouldn’t always 
think of it as an equitable remedy, the declaratory judgment as a foundation for 
an injunction is a major equitable feature. The federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act says that a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any in-
terested party,”258 not that it must do so. Courts understand this text “to confer 
on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to de-
clare the rights of litigants.”259 We have found it “more consistent with the stat-
ute,” however, “to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, be-
cause facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and 
the fitness of the case for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.”260 
9. The Injunction’s Terms 
We turn from the judge’s discretion to choose the remedy to her discretion 
in formulating and measuring the remedy she picked. The remedy’s size and 
shape offer the trial judge copious equitable discretion and leeway.261 The 
judge, the Supreme Court said, has equitable discretion to enter any available 
remedy necessary to afford full relief for the defendant’s invasion of the plain-
tiff’s legal rights.262 Another court wrote that “[t]he trial court is vested with a 
                                                        
256  CHARLES MITCHELL & STEPHEN WATTERSON, SUBROGATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.152 
(2007). 
257  Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1105, 
1141 (2014). 
258  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
259  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995); see also Bray, supra note 257, at 
1101 n.53 (2014). Professor Bray wrote that mandamus is a discretionary legal remedy; he 
lists the declaratory judgment along with it and other “legal” remedies that have been histor-
ically defined as “equitable” remedies. Bray, supra note 21, at 52–53. 
260  Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289. 
261  Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990); 
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200–01 (2d Cir. 1984); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood 
Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 176 (Del. 2002); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 
701, 714 (Del. 1983); YORIO & THEL, supra note 245, § 1.3 n.55. 
262  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16, 25 (1971); SEC, 745 
F.2d at 200; Cox v. Cox, 704 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986); Gotham Partners, L.P., 
817 A.2d at 176; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. 
Summer 2015] TRIUMPH OF EQUITY REVISITED 1435 
broad discretionary power to shape and fashion injunctive relief to fit the par-
ticular facts, circumstances, and equities of the case before it. Appellate courts 
give great weight to the trial court’s exercise of that discretion.”263 
In protecting plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the judge should examine de-
fendant’s violation264 and seek a solution that situates the plaintiffs in “the posi-
tion they would have occupied in the absence of” the defendant’s violation.265 
The reasonable observer may inquire whether the statements are legal rules or 
aspirations and whether they are consistent with countervailing considerations 
like separation of powers, federalism, and logistics expressed as “all deliberate 
speed,” discussed below. 
In a contextual decision, the wisest course is to hear from and defer to the 
decisionmaker on the scene. “On such a highly particular question, we are 
compelled,” the California Supreme Court observed, “to defer to the superior 
knowledge of the trial judge, who is in a better position than we to determine 
what conditions ‘on the ground’ . . . will reasonably permit.”266 The trial judge 
possesses ample equitable discretion even when a buffer zone that limits the 
defendant’s free speech rights to picket an abortion clinic are at issue.267 “Al-
though one might quibble about whether 15 feet is too great or too small a dis-
tance if the goal is to ensure access [to the clinic], we defer to the District 
Court’s reasonable assessment of the number of feet necessary to keep the en-
trances clear.”268 
The buffer zone illustrates another point: a judge may draft an injunction 
that regulates the defendant’s conduct that isn’t otherwise regulated by positive 
law. An abortion clinic buffer zone may forbid the defendant’s protest on the 
public sidewalk in front of the clinic—ancillary, preparatory, and related activi-
ty that, except for the injunction, would be legal, perhaps constitutionally pro-
tected expression.269 Professor Tracy Thomas has advocated for broad and spe-
cific “prophylactic” injunctions that forbid “the facilitators of harm in order to 
prevent continued illegality.”270 
John Norton Pomeroy’s equity treatise includes a lengthy quotation from a 
federal court’s decision that defined and praised equitable discretion to tailor 
the remedy to the plaintiff’s injury and a sensible solution: 
There is a very great difference between seeking to recover damages at law for 
an injury already inflicted by several parties, acting independently of each other, 
                                                        
263  Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517 (Wash. 1986) (emphasis omitted). 
264  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88–89 (1995). 
265  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
266  People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 616 (Cal. 1997). 
267  Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377–81 (1997). 
268  Id. at 381. 
269  Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion, supra note 2, at 88–98. 
270  Tracy A. Thomas, The Continued Vitality of Prophylactic Relief, 27 REV. LITIG. 99, 99 
(2007). 
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and restraining parties from committing a nuisance . . . in the future. In equity 
the court is not tied down to one particular form of judgment. It can adapt its de-
crees to the circumstances in each case, and give the proper relief as against each 
party, without reference to the action of others, and without injury to either. 
Each is dealt with with respect only to his own acts, either as affected or unaf-
fected by the acts of the others. It is not necessary, for the purpose of prevention 
of future injury, to ascertain what particular share of the damages each defendant 
has inflicted in the past, or is about to inflict in the future. It is enough to know 
that he has contributed, and is continuing to contribute, to a nuisance, without 
ascertaining to what extent, and to restrain him from contributing at all. But if 
otherwise, I do not perceive why the proportion of the injury inflicted by each 
may not be ascertained when practicable, and the decree adapted to give a prop-
er remedy as to each. The greater elasticity in the forms and modes of proceed-
ings in equity enables the court to so mold its decrees as to meet the special cir-
cumstances of each defendant, and thus do entire justice to many parties, under 
circumstances wherein a judgment at law would be wholly inadequate—
circumstances which would render it impracticable to unite them in one action in 
that form of proceeding. And this is the foundation of the well-established dis-
tinction between law and equity with reference to the joinder and non-joinder of 
parties in the same proceeding. The very object of establishing courts of equity 
was to furnish a tribunal adapted to do complete justice in complex cases, often 
involving many parties, in which the courts of law, by reason of their restricted 
powers resulting from their modes of proceeding, could not afford adequate re-
lief.271 
A lawsuit in early 2015 between states in the Supreme Court’s original ju-
risdiction is a contemporary illustration that a court’s equitable discretion to 
mould the remedy’s specific terms has continuing vitality. In Kansas v. Ne-
braska,272 the Supreme Court dealt with equitable apportionment of streams and 
rivers between the States of Kansas and Nebraska. The Court based its decision 
on the newly minted section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment that established the remedy of a defendant’s disgorgement 
of gains from its opportunistic breach. The Court approved the Special Master’s 
equitable discretion to impose a flexible remedy in light of the facts and their 
context and to award Kansas partial, instead of full all-or-nothing, disgorge-
ment.273 
The trial judge can have too much equitable discretion.274 The judge’s eq-
uitable discretion to shape the plaintiff’s relief will include logistics and specif-
ic context. But how and when to vindicate the plaintiff’s right, what to order or 
forbid, and when to forbid it may be affected by the well-known, or notorious, 
“all deliberate speed” standard, articulated in the Supreme Court’s remedial de-
                                                        
271  Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co. (The Debris Case), 16 F. 25, 29–30 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1883). 
272  Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015). 
273  Id. at 1058–59; see also Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the 
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 552 
(1980). 
274  Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 872 F.2d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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cision in Brown II regarding school desegregation.275 In that case, without or-
dering any relief for the named plaintiffs, the Supreme Court remanded the so-
lution to the trial judges with the following instructions: 
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by eq-
uitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical 
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling 
public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional at-
tributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in ad-
mission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in 
making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the consti-
tutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may 
properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles 
in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vi-
tality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply be-
cause of disagreement with them. . . . [T]he cases are remanded to the District 
Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent 
with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a ra-
cially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cas-
es.276 
Desegregation wasn’t immediate. Its pavane lasted fifteen years through 
individual solutions under “freedom of choice” before advancing to specific 
districts and busing. Although we cannot attribute the entire course of school 
desegregation to “all deliberate speed,” it symbolized a lack of serious resolve 
and urgency to move from principle to implementation.277 While avoiding 
“immediate confrontation,” the standard was “ultimately unrealistic.”278 
After Judge Pepper found that BeefCo’s feedlot was a nuisance, Field 
moved for an injunction. The remedy the judge selected is a conditions injunc-
tion: Defendant BeefCo may continue its feedlot, but it is limited to five hun-
dred steers in residence. 
Even after the judge decides to grant the plaintiff an injunction, the ques-
tion of timing remains: when will the injunction become effective? The logis-
tics and timing of reducing the herd are matters within the judge’s equitable 
discretion. BeefCo favors a “practical” injunction that allows it to finish feed-
ing all the cattle now on the lot until they are ready for the terminal market but 
                                                        
275  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
276  Id. at 300–01 (footnotes omitted) (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 
(1944)). 
277  Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty: A Golden Anniversary or 
a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School Desegregation Remedy?, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575 (2004). But see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE 
L.J. 585, 598–606 (1983) (finding it proper for a court to decline full enforcement of plain-
tiffs’ constitutional rights). 
278  BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 29–33, 58–59 (1997). For Justice Frankfurter’s pivotal role in “all 
deliberate speed,” the “touchstone of liberal criticism,” see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE 
BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ch. 42 (2010). 
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that forbids it from adding any new steers to the lot. Although Field agrees that 
BeefCo can’t move 1,500 steers overnight, he thinks that a fortnight is enough 
time. Judge Pepper gives BeefCo sixty days to reduce its herd. 
10. Attorney Fee 
Suppose that, after Judge Pepper grants Field’s motion for a permanent in-
junction, Field looks around the neighborhood, figures out that every farmer in 
the range of BeefCo’s odor benefits from the injunction’s odor-reduction, con-
cludes that he has litigated successfully and created a significant public benefit 
that transcends his individual benefit, and moves to recover his attorney fee un-
der the state-law private-attorney-general doctrine.279 “[I]n the absence of a 
statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to 
award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity.”280 Once the judge has decided to award an attorney fee, her 
decision setting their amount, like many contextual and fact-specific decisions, 
is grounded in broad discretion if she follows proper procedure, applies the ap-
propriate standards, and makes no clearly erroneous factual mistakes.281 
But federal Judge Pepper declines to grant attorney fees under the state-law 
exception to the American Rule. 
11. Contempt for Violation of the Injunction 
Suppose BeefCo is out of compliance with the injunction because it is 
feeding seven hundred steers in violation of the injunction’s five hundred-steer 
cap. 
A federal judge’s discretion in criminal contempt is limited because the 
district attorney will usually exercise prosecutorial discretion before maintain-
ing criminal contempt.282 How to enforce an injunction with civil contempt in-
volves a sense of the context, the people involved, and the situation. The two 
forms of civil contempt are compensatory contempt and coercive contempt. In 
compensatory contempt, the judge orders the defendant to pay the plaintiff for 
the harm its violation caused the plaintiff.283 In coercive contempt, the judge 
undertakes to secure for the plaintiff the substantive interest the defendant 
                                                        
279  Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977); Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. 
v. Davis Cnty. Clerk, 175 P.3d 1036 (Utah 2007). The United States Supreme Court rejected 
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Summer 2015] TRIUMPH OF EQUITY REVISITED 1439 
threatens or violates; the judge coerces the defendant with daily fines or im-
prisonment until the defendant relents and obeys.284 
Beginning with compensatory contempt, would the judge have equitable 
discretion to find that the defendant has violated the injunction, harming the 
plaintiff, and that it is in “contempt,” but then to decline to order the defendant 
to pay the plaintiff compensation? Leaving the plaintiff with his rights violated 
but without a remedy is a serious step. On this matter, the Supreme Court has 
said: 
In the determination of the question whether an injunction has been violated and, 
if so, whether compensation shall be made to the injured party, there may be oc-
casion for the exercise of judicial discretion; but the order to be entered in such a 
proceeding is not exclusively or necessarily a discretionary one. Moreover, legal 
discretion in such a case does not extend to a refusal to apply well-settled prin-
ciples of law to a conceded state of facts.285 
Later courts have held that the judge lacks discretion not to employ com-
pensatory contempt.286 We think that, under the circumstances, Field will be 
entitled to a decree of compensatory contempt. 
The trial judge’s discretion in employing coercive contempt measures pre-
sent a more mixed picture. The trial judge “has broad discretion to design a 
remedy that will bring about compliance.”287 A judge’s discretion in selecting a 
coercive contempt sanction is limited to using “the least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed.”288 Judge Robert Carter freed two contemnors, ob-
serving the following: 
A district judge has wide latitude in a civil contempt situation in determining 
whether to order coercive incarceration at all, and if incarceration is deemed 
warranted, the length of incarceration imposed is within his sound discretion as 
long as it does not extend beyond the grand jury term. . . . Having ordered coer-
cive incarceration for a certain period, surely the judge may in his discretion 
modify his judgment, based upon whatever rational considerations appeal to 
him, including ordering that the coercive incarceration be terminated short of the 
time originally fixed without the contemnor having complied with the court’s 
order.289 
Suppose Judge Pepper orders BeefCo’s CEO confined until the feedlot’s 
census is five hundred or less. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Simkin v. United States in 1983, several years after Judge Carter’s decision in 
                                                        
284  Id. at 691–833. 
285  Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922) (citations omitted). 
286  Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946); Nat’l Research Bureau, Inc. v. 
Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thompson v. Johnson, 410 F. Supp. 633, 
643 (E.D. Pa.1976). 
287  Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 673 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1982). 
288  Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (quoting another source) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
289  In re Cueto, 443 F. Supp. 857, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
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the paragraph above to free the contemnors.290 The court stated a “no realistic 
possibility” of obedience test for release and made two points that are not easy 
to reconcile.291 First, the trial judge has “virtually unreviewable discretion” in 
setting and ending coercive contempt.292 Second, because of the Recalcitrant 
Witness statute’s eighteen-month cap on confinement of a contemnor for coer-
cive contempt, “in the absence of unusual circumstances” a reviewing court 
should not “conclude, as a matter of due process, that a civil contempt sanction 
has lost its coercive impact at some point prior to the eighteen-month period 
prescribed as a maximum by Congress.”293 The Simkin test and its mixed 
standards of review have created confusion that has exacerbated an already dif-
ficult inquiry.294 
Because of the judge’s equitable discretion under opaque doctrine, we 
stand nonplused, unable to answer the question of whether Judge Pepper should 
terminate coercive contempt and release BeefCo’s CEO. We return to his ap-
peal below. 
12. Motion to Modify or Dissolve the Injunction 
Suppose that after time passes, defendant BeefCo thinks the five hundred-
steer injunction is obsolete because the law or the facts have changed. Maybe 
the legislature has passed or amended a “right-to-farm” tort-reform statute. 
Maybe a genius has invented cattle feed that eliminates cow manure’s odor. 
Whether the judge should modify or dissolve an injunction turns on a Rule 
that is explicitly equitable: the judge may grant the defendant’s motion for re-
lief from an injunction if “applying it prospectively is no longer equitable.”295 
Reopening and dissolving an injunction was a practice that was formerly under 
the court’s inherent equitable power.296 The Federal Rules converted it into a 
Rule. 
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Supreme Court construed this 
Rule. It held that “a party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the 
burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revi-
sion of the decree” and that “the proposed modification is suitably tailored to 
the changed circumstance.”297 Justice O’Connor thought that the majority’s test 
                                                        
290  Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983). 
291  Id. at 37–39. 
292  Id. at 38. 
293  Id. at 37. 
294  Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984). 
295  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). 
296  United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 113–15 (1932); Marcus, supra note 94, at 
1572. 
297  Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). The leading scholarly 
article is David I. Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The 
Course of Institutional Reform Cases After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 579, 584–85 (1993). 
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didn’t add much, if anything, to the Rule: “I am not certain that the product of 
this effort . . . makes matters any clearer than the equally general language of 
Rule 60(b)(5).”298 
The Court’s 2009 majority opinion in Horne v. Flores on whether to modi-
fy or dissolve the injunction was unsympathetic to the structural injunction un-
der review. The majority opinion’s close factual examination and emphasis on 
federalism militated against the trial judge’s equitable discretion.299 This left 
open for the future the scope of the trial judge’s equitable discretion to dissolve 
or modify a large-scale or structural injunction. 
In the unlikely event of odorless manure, BeefCo’s motion to dissolve the 
feedlot injunction will succeed because of a change in the facts. The right-to-
farm statute as a change in the law presents a closer issue. 
13. Stay of an Injunction on Appeal 
Suppose the trial judge granted plaintiff Field a permanent injunction that 
orders BeefCo’s feedlot to be reduced to five hundred within sixty days. Beef-
Co’s appeal with briefing, argument, and an appellate opinion will likely take at 
least a year. Either the trial judge or the court of appeals may stay an injunction 
or the court of appeals may grant an appellate injunction pending review.300 
What role does equitable discretion play in the decision on whether to stay 
an injunction? In Hovey v. McDonald, in 1883, the trial judge had dismissed the 
plaintiff’s bill in equity and ordered a court-appointed receiver to pay disputed 
funds to the defendants. The plaintiff appealed, but the judge did not stay the 
decree pending appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed. It explained that the deci-
sion whether to stay an equitable decree pending appeal rested with the discre-
tion of the trial court. “The court below, it is true, in view of the appeal, might 
have made an order to continue the injunction and to retain the property in the 
receiver’s hands; but that was a matter of discretion, to be exercised according 
to the justice of the case.”301 The judge’s equitable discretion continues today. 
In 2009, the Supreme Court said that a “stay is not a matter of right, even if ir-
reparable injury might otherwise result” but, is instead “an exercise of judicial 
discretion.”302 
A recent example of equitable discretion to stay a preliminary injunction is 
Judge Haden’s opinion in Bragg v. Robertson, a lawsuit we discussed above 
with his on-site visit and the injunction bond. The judge had granted environ-
mentalist plaintiffs both a preliminary injunction and a final injunction forbid-
ding mountain-top-removal mining.303 The injunction brought the Mountain 
                                                        
298  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 394 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
299  Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 459–70 (2009). 
300  FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a)(2). 
301  Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U.S. 150, 158 (1883). 
302  Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). 
303  Bragg v. Robertson, 54 F. Supp. 2d 635 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). 
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State’s Congressional delegation into an alliance with both the United Mine 
Workers and the coal companies. 
Although the appealing defendants failed to present arguments that met the 
established standard for a stay, Judge Haden quenched the “firestorm” of mis-
understanding and misrepresentation.304 He quoted the Supreme Court: “the 
traditional stay factors contemplate individualized judgments in each case, 
[and] the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules.”305 Judge Haden 
concluded that: 
[T]he shrill atmosphere of discord must subside so that our Court of Appeals 
and this Court are able to address the crucially important legal issues . . . . [T]he 
Court believes it preferable to attempt to defuse invective and diminish irrational 
fears so that reasoned decisions can be made with all deliberate speed, but with 
distractions minimized. Accordingly, and of its own volition and discretion, the 
Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to stay the permanent injunction pending 
appellate action.306 
In short, the trial judge’s standardless, open-ended equitable discretion 
governed. The observer can imagine school desegregation’s snail’s pace if Dis-
trict Court judges in the Deep South had stayed their orders because of public 
opposition. 
Judge Pepper, citing her equitable discretion, grants BeefCo’s motion to 
stay the five hundred-steer permanent shutdown injunction, but she continues 
in place the two thousand-steer preliminary injunction. 
14. Collecting the Money Judgment 
Collection is statutory; courts construe the technical statutes strictly. How-
ever, equitable discretion exists even in judgment collection. Under Federal 
Rule 69(a), the judgment creditor’s federal court discovery in aid of execution 
uses either federal or state procedure. The debtor’s examination emerged from 
the equitable creditor’s bill.307 As the Supreme Court said in 2014, discovery in 
aid of execution is discretionary. The Court then held that the judgment credi-
tor’s discovery of judgment debtor Argentina’s assets in banks was not limited 
by the judgment debtor’s sovereign immunity.308 
Suppose that, in addition to a prospective injunction, Field won a $275,000 
money judgment. Collection may be routine because the farmer as judgment 
creditor can either file his judgment for a judgment lien or garnish BeefCo’s 
bank account; if the defendant appeals and posts an appeal or supersedeas 
bond, the plaintiff can collect from the bond if the appellate court affirms. Sup-
                                                        
304  Bragg v. Robertson, 190 F.R.D. 194, 196 (S.D.W. Va. 1999). 
305  Id. (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). 
306  Id. 
307  VERN COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 90–91 (2d ed. 
1974); STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS’ REMEDIES AND 
DEBTORS’ PROTECTION 266–67 (4th ed. 1987). 
308  Republic of Arg. v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2256–58 (2014). 
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pose, however, that Field has the sheriff levy execution on the feedlot’s steers 
and buys them in a rushed auction for 25 percent of their market value.309 
A New Jersey court claimed inherent equitable authority in the absence of 
statute to prevent a windfall and unjust enrichment. The court held that if an 
unsecured judgment creditor like farmer Field purchases the judgment debtor’s 
property at a sheriff’s execution sale for a nominal amount and is able to resell 
it for market value, then to prevent the judgment creditor’s windfall and double 
recovery, the judgment debtor is entitled to a fair market value credit and to a 
restitution judgment for the excess. 
[A] judgment creditor’s efforts to satisfy the judgment by execution upon the 
debtor’s property is subject to the court’s inherent equitable authority “to pre-
vent a potential double recovery or windfall to the judgment creditor.” In our 
view, this equitable authority may extend to entry of an affirmative money 
judgment in the debtor’s favor if necessary to prevent a windfall to the judgment 
creditor.310 
Restitution to the rescue for BeefCo to recover Field’s unjust enrichment. 
On a related issue, the Supreme Court stated: 
Equitable relief against fraudulent judgments is not of statutory creation. It is a 
judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to 
time, arise from a hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the gen-
eral rule that judgments should not be disturbed after the term of their entry has 
expired. Created to avert the evils of archaic rigidity, this equitable procedure 
has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to meet new situa-
tions which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary 
to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations.311 
15. The Appeal and the Scope of Review on Appeal 
The trial judge shares decisionmaking authority with the appellate court.312 
The loser’s appeal is a crucial principle of confinement on the trial judge’s eq-
uitable discretion. The skirmish line where discretion ameliorates the rigorous 
application of general rules isn’t erased on appeal. The Fifth Circuit, which re-
versed the trial judge below it, observed that one area where tension occurs is 
between trial judges and appellate courts: 
[I]t may not be amiss to observe that we entirely sympathize with the desire of 
the [trial] court to amend its judgment to bring about substantial justice in the 
case before it. Trial judges are more directly and immediately confronted by the 
demands of doing justice, case by case, than are we; indeed, this is their primary 
                                                        
309  DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA §§ 3.5(E), 3.6 
(3d ed. 2014). 
310  MMU of N.Y., Inc. v. Grieser, 999 A.2d 1204, 1211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(citation omitted); Hornbuckle v. Harris, 686 P.2d 418, 420 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
311  Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944); Bornman v. 
Gordon, 527 A.2d 109, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating equitable standard to set aside a 
sheriff’s sale). 
312  See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976). 
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office and duty. Yet it is the considered judgment of our polity that in the long 
run—if not perhaps in the given case—justice is better served by adherence to 
general rules. Today we address that rare case in which, it well may be, the trial 
court has done better justice in the case but, in doing so, has gone beyond the 
powers granted it by such rules.313 
As then-District Judge Sentelle explained the Rainbow People’s consent 
decree, context matters. “To act as I did—result-oriented, doing equity accord-
ing to my own conscience, with questionable basis in law—is not consistent 
with my judicial philosophy. A judicial philosophy may sustain a court of ap-
peals judge or a supreme court justice.” While, on the other hand, “[a] trial 
judge has to deal not just with the law, but with people. . . . [S]ometimes the 
judge must rise above his philosophy.”314 
In our feedlot-nuisance lawsuit, suppose that the trial judge refused de-
fendant BeefCo’s proffered jury instruction based on the state’s right-to-farm 
statute. The trial ended with a general jury verdict and judgment for plaintiff 
Field for $275,000 damages for past injury that included an undetermined 
amount for pain and suffering and emotional distress. After the trial, Judge 
Pepper rejected BeefCo’s post-trial motions and granted Field’s motion for a 
permanent injunction that limited BeefCo’s feedlot to five hundred steers, 
which she stayed on appeal at two thousand. BeefCo appeals both liability and 
remedy. 
A federal court of appeals reviews the trial court’s final judgments.315 At 
final judgment, many of the trial judge’s procedural decisions, for example, set-
ting the date of trial within wide limits, will be moot and insulated from appel-
late examination, correction, and meddling. 
Appellate courts check trial court decisions. Appellate decisions refine and 
clarify the law, limiting trial judges’ discretion in future lawsuits.316 
The standard of review defines and measures the scrutiny that an appellate 
court wields.317 We will examine three standards of review: de novo, clearly 
erroneous, and abuse of discretion.318 
Federal Rule 50 governs the verdict loser’s motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law (“JMOL”), which, after trial, and on appeal, tests the jury’s finding of 
fact at trial.319 Because of the Seventh Amendment’s reexamination clause, the 
                                                        
313  Trahan v. First Nat’l Bank of Ruston, 720 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1983); SCHAUER, supra 
note 224, at ch. 8.6. 
314  SENTELLE, supra note 186, at 157. 
315  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
316  See Anthony Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary 
Common Law World, 110 LAW Q. REV. 238, 258 (1994). 
317  Cravens, supra note 15, at 953. 
318  There are other standards of review. In the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, which 
is equitable, the master receives respect and a tacit presumption of correctness, but the Court 
reviews the record independently and looks at everything. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 
1042, 1051 (2015). 
319  FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
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federal trial judge and appellate court review a jury’s factual decisions on cred-
ibility of witnesses, weighing conflicting evidence, and drawing inferences def-
erentially. Could a reasonable juror reach that decision on the evidence? A 
question of fact becomes a question of law when the substantive law requires a 
particular finding on clear facts. 
The verdict-loser’s post-trial motion will usually ask for a JMOL, and, in 
the alternative, a new trial.320 Short of granting a final judgment, or JMOL, the 
trial judge can express uncertainty about the jury’s factfinding by granting the 
verdict loser’s motion for a new trial. 
A federal court of appeals applies the same deferential standard, and re-
views the trial judge’s decision on the verdict loser’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law de novo.321 
The chief factual questions for the jury in our nuisance trial were whether 
BeefCo was liable under substantive nuisance law and, if so, the amount of 
Field’s damages. These findings seem safe on appeal. 
The judge’s decision on a question of law receives plenary, de novo, right-
or-wrong review. In granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss because the 
plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim, motion for summary judgment, or 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, a judge’s incorrect decision of law 
treads on the jury’s constitutionally fortified factfinding role. The trial judge 
decided to reject defendant BeefCo’s arguments that the state right-to-farm 
statute barred Field’s recovery or that, at least, the jury should be instructed to 
apply the statute were questions of law. The Court of Appeals will reverse her 
decision if she got that legal issue wrong. 
In deciding a substantive equity issue or an equitable remedy, the trial 
judge decides factual issues of credibility, weighing, and drawing inferences. 
With no Seventh Amendment, the Court of Appeals reviews the judge’s finding 
of fact after a bench trial a little less deferentially than it reviews a jury’s deci-
sion: the appellate court asks whether the facts the lower court judge found are 
“clearly erroneous.”322 
In addition, in contrast to most juries’ general verdicts, the trial judge must 
“find the facts specially.”323 Unlike the jury, the judge must think through the 
factual issues carefully enough to articulate a decision that provides the court of 
appeals a satisfactory way to review it. Although the trial judge makes findings 
of fact, factfinding isn’t part of the appellate court’s function of developing and 
administering the law. An appellate court’s review of a trial judge’s factfinding 
is to correct errors. The court of appeals will reverse the trial judge’s factual 
                                                        
320  FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
321  HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW: REVIEW OF DISTRICT 
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decision if, with deference to the judge’s ability to evaluate the witnesses’ cred-
ibility, her finding is “clearly erroneous.” It is difficult to compare review of 
the motion for JMOL with the clear-error test because “[e]ach standard is shift-
ing and fugitive.”324 Clearly erroneous review is, nevertheless, less deferential 
than review of a jury’s finding of fact.325 If the feedlot-nuisance trial had been 
before the judge ore tenus, we still think that her factual findings would be safe. 
The trial judge’s equitable discretion may be circumscribed by a standard 
of de novo factual review.326 An example is the Iowa Supreme Court’s unfortu-
nate and notorious opinion in Painter v. Bannister. The appellate court reversed 
the trial judge’s decision that, in his best interests, a little boy’s widowed father 
should not have custody of him. Instead the appellate court awarded custody to 
the child’s grandparents (his deceased mother’s parents). 
The [grandparents’] home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, convention-
al, middleclass, middlewest background and an opportunity for a college educa-
tion and profession, if he desires it. It provides a solid foundation and secure at-
mosphere. In [his father’s] home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct 
and thought with an opportunity to develop his individual talents. It would be 
more exciting and challenging in many respects, but romantic, impractical and 
unstable. . . . We believe it would be unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, 
and probably intellectually stimulating.327 
As part of the appellate court’s factual review, it also rejected the trial 
judge’s evaluation of an expert witness.328 
An appellate court’s de novo factual review erodes the trial judge’s equita-
ble discretion and moves much of it to the appellate court. If the appellate court 
follows that standard in our feedlot trial, it may reverse the trial judge if the ap-
pellate judges think the trial judge’s factfinding was mistaken. 
The standard of review that comes closest to equitable discretion is abuse 
of discretion. The appellate court’s review for abuse of discretion governs 
many issues between the trial judge and the court of appeals.329 When there is 
                                                        
324  Cooper, supra note 68, at 650. 
325  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 321, at ch. IV; Cooper, supra note 68, at 660. 
326  Nichols v. City of Evansdale, 687 N.W.2d 562, 567 (Iowa 2004) (finding de novo review 
qualified for the trial judge’s credibility decisions); Ficke v. Wolken, 858 N.W.2d 249, 254 
(Neb. Ct. App. 2014) (giving weight to the trial judge’s finding of credibility). 
327  Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154, 156 (Iowa 1966). 
328  Id. at 156. The opinion contains no statement of its de novo factual review, but its result 
and its citations make clear that it is evaluating the facts anew. See id. (citing Finken v. Por-
ter, 72 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1955)). The Iowa Supreme Court treats a habeas corpus action for 
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IOWA L. REV. 919, 926–27 n.47 (1963). 
329  But see Brunet, supra note 33, at 301 (“[T]he undefined and sketchy nature of this re-
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more than one “correct” decision, the trial judge has discretion and, on appeal, 
the court of appeals will inquire whether the trial judge’s discretion was abused 
instead of whether the judge’s decision was “correct.” The court of appeals 
judges may approve, or not disapprove, even when the trial judge decided dif-
ferently than they would have.330 
The leading treatise on the federal standard of review distinguishes two 
types of appellate review for a trial judge’s abuse of discretion, which I will 
stay with our rural hypothetical and call loose-rein and tight-rein review.331 The 
treatise puts supervision of litigation in the loose-rein type. The trial judge’s 
supervision of litigation, including discovery and evidence rulings, is accorded 
wide discretion. For example, if Judge Pepper had set the date for trial of 
Field’s feedlot nuisance for either thirty days or five years after defendant 
BeefCo answered Field’s complaint, that would probably have been an abuse of 
discretion. But the trial judge has ample discretion in the midrange between the 
extremes. The judge must consider and evaluate the factors. Of course, the 
judge has no discretion to apply an erroneous legal standard. Nor may the judge 
make a palpable mistake of judgment.332 
The trial judge’s decisions on remedy seem to be in the treatise’s category 
of more tight-reined and closely confined discretion. The judge should examine 
and apply the appropriate standards. The remedy should fall within the “range 
of choices permitted.” “Discretion is not whim,” Chief Justice Roberts quoted 
himself, “and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the 
basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.”333 
For example, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody the Supreme Court re-
viewed a decision where the trial judge had granted the claimant an injunction, 
but had declined to award back pay.334 After finding employment discrimina-
tion, the trial judge reinstated the plaintiff, an injunction.335 But the judge de-
clined to award the plaintiff back pay because the defendant had not acted in 
bad faith and because the plaintiff had waited too long to file suit.336 The Su-
preme Court rejected the judge’s reasoning.337 In view of Congress’s statutory 
purposes—compensation and deterrence (specifically, deterring continued dis-
crimination)—the judge’s equitable discretion and power weren’t open end-
                                                        
330  Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 650–53 (1971). 
331  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 321, at ch. V. Professors Rosenberg and Marcus also distin-
guish tight- and loose-reined discretion. Marcus, supra note 94, at 1565–67. Professor Cra-
vens wrote that abuse of discretion has no single meaning. Cravens, supra note 15, at 949–
51. 
332  EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 321, at ch. V. 
333  eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting 
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)). 
334  Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 408–10 (1975). 
335  See RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 2, at 412. 
336  Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 410. 
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ed.338 In particular, the trial judge, the Court held, cannot refuse to award a suc-
cessful plaintiff back pay simply because the defendant had not acted in bad 
faith, for that would undermine both compensation and deterrence.339 Judges’ 
decisions refusing to award a plaintiff back pay should, the Court said, be rare 
and the judge must state reasons to decline back pay.340 
Thus, a trial judge’s equitable decisions on the plaintiff’s remedy are not 
open-ended, but they are subject to standards and to congressional purpose. A 
uniform approach to review for abuse of discretion cannot, however, be discov-
ered. Review for abuse of discretion is not one but several tests.341 
In Rufo, summarized above, Justice O’Connor, concurring, argued for a 
permissive procedural definition of abuse of discretion: 
Determining what is “equitable” is necessarily a task that entails substantial dis-
cretion, particularly in a case like this one, where the District Court must make 
complex decisions requiring the sensitive balancing of a host of factors. As a re-
sult, an appellate court should examine primarily the method in which the Dis-
trict Court exercises its discretion, not the substantive outcome the District Court 
reaches. If the District Court takes into account the relevant considerations (all 
of which are not likely to suggest the same result) and accommodates them in a 
reasonable way, then the District Court’s judgment will not be an abuse of its 
discretion, regardless of whether an appellate court would have reached the 
same outcome in the first instance.342 
This deferential standard resembles other extremely permissive standards 
of review. The first is the business-judgment rule that a court applies in litiga-
tion about board and director strategic decisionmaking. The second is a col-
lege’s procedural review committee’s standard for review of a department’s de-
cision not to renew or deny tenure.343 It may be too deferential if it nearly 
eliminates appellate review. Several thoughtful scholars favor a procedural 
                                                        
338  Id. at 417. 
339  Id. at 422–23. 
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343  AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 94–98 (11th. ed. 2015). 
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standard of review that is tempered by requiring the trial judge to apply over-
arching principles and articulate reasons for the appellate court to review.344 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne v. Flores also 
dealt with review of a defendant’s motion to dissolve or modify an injunction. 
The majority’s skeptical analysis and factual review led the dissent to argue, 
cogently, it seems to me, that the majority hadn’t really reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.345 
The judge’s injunction-drafting decisions are decisions where the judge’s 
equitable discretion is copious. The scrutiny with which the appellate court 
views Judge Pepper’s five-hundred-steer permanent injunction depends on that 
court’s attitude toward the lawsuit viewed through the lens or kaleidoscope of 
abuse of discretion. That review can be too aggressive as in de novo factual re-
view, or too lenient as in procedural review. Review in the midrange leads to 
affirmance. 
Appellate review of contempt may be more intrusive. Suppose, in the feed-
lot scenario, that the trial judge has ordered BeefCo’s CEO to be confined to 
coerce him to obey an order to reduce the feedlot’s census to five hundred. The 
trial judge has rejected his motion to be released. He appeals. How much 
should an appellate court defer to a trial judge’s decision to continue a contem-
nor’s coercive confinement? 
The trial judge’s decision on whether to release a contemnor who is incar-
cerated for coercive contempt involves the contemnor’s liberty, which was tak-
en under a civil standard and procedure. Given the possibility that the trial 
judge’s emotional commitment to her order has clouded her judgment, it seems 
to be a propitious time for a second eye or eyes. The court of appeals will re-
view coercion by asking whether the judge’s measures were reasonable and not 
arbitrary.346 
The Simkin court stated a “no realistic possibility” test for a confined con-
temnor’s release and granted “virtually unreviewable discretion” to the trial 
judge.347 Although trial judges chafe at the test,348 it does grant them considera-
ble autonomy. Perhaps too much. 
Such a deferential standard of review may be inappropriate when a long-
distance contemnor appeals a trial judge’s decision to continue her confine-
ment. In Jean Elizabeth Morgan’s coercive-contempt appeal, the District of Co-
lumbia court explicitly rejected the Simkin court’s standard: “We cannot settle 
                                                        
344  See, e.g., Cravens, supra note 15, at 947; Effron, supra note 33; Yablon, supra note 67, 
at 256; see also OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 54 (2003). 
345  Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 493 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
346  Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 673 F.2d 53, 56–57 (2d Cir. 1982). 
347  Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37–39 (2d Cir. 1983). 
348  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 994 F. Supp. 2d 510, 516 (S.D.N.Y 2014). 
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for a ‘virtually unreviewable’ exercise of trial court discretion when due pro-
cess of law is at stake.”349 
We suggest other measures than coercive confinement to cull BeefCo’s 
herd, perhaps a receiver or master to sell its excess steers. 
CONCLUSION 
How well do Steve Subrin’s concerns about equitable decisionmaking hold 
up? Steve’s too-much-discretion agenda considered the entire Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. It is both broader and narrower than mine, which examines 
discretion in things named equity both in and out of the Rules. 
Discretion generally, including equitable discretion, is a concept much in 
need of refinement.350 Our survey gives us reasons to agree with Steve. As we 
have seen, courts claim equitable discretion across a broad spectrum of deci-
sions: substantive, choice of remedy, equitable defenses, and measurement of a 
remedy. In substantive choice of remedy and equitable defenses decisions, 
courts’ declarations of equitable discretion often overreach. 
Courts claim broad discretion; for example, “there are no established rules 
and fixed principles laid down for the application of equity. Rather, equity de-
pends essentially upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.”351 
One of Steve’s points, and mine, is that the judge’s discretionary decisionmak-
ing ought to yield to her attention to rules, precedents, and standards keeping 
her pragmatic eye on consequences.352 A court should eschew the guise of an-
cient language to cloak unprincipled discretion. “The law and Judges should 
avoid arcane interpretations and debates about law but should instead judge the 
overall equity or justice of a situation and decide accordingly,” Professor Gra-
ham Virgo wrote, quoting Sir Thomas More’s Utopia.353 
An appellate court should not substitute statements of equitable discretion 
for developing standards and precedent. Nor should it allow a trial judge to ig-
nore substantive law or the basic remedial rules. If courts were to reduce their 
use of the language of equitable discretion, develop rules and standards, and 
decide discrete remedial issues according to uniform remedial criteria, then 
much progress would occur. 
Statutes affect equitable discretion.354 The Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids a 
federal judge from granting an injunction against a strike in all but very limited 
                                                        
349  Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1, 7 n.5 (D.C. 1989); Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and 
Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 185, 190 (1991). 
350  Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 469, 470 (1986). 
351  Omega Indus., Inc. v. Raffaele, 894 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (D. Nev. 1995) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
352  Shapiro, supra note 17, at 546–47, 589; see also Wolff, supra note 47. 
353  Virgo, supra note 65, at 21. 
354  Shapiro, supra note 17, at 580. 
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circumstances.355 The Prison Litigation Reform Act limits prison conditions in-
junctions.356 Aside from the idea above that, when a statute provides for an in-
junction, a judge should be generous, the way a statute affects a judge’s equita-
ble discretion isn’t always clear, indeed sometimes it is frankly a muddle.357 
The preliminary injunction standard isn’t governed by a rule, the injunction 
bond is.358 Yet, while courts of appeals have established standards for prelimi-
nary injunctions, albeit not always satisfactory ones, courts’ injunction bond 
decisions wander over discretion on several points. 
In measuring and defining a winning plaintiff’s equitable remedy, a trial 
judge has the discretion of an initial decisionmaker. The judge’s remedy is in-
dividualized to the dispute and the litigants; it gives the winner what the law 
says he is entitled to receive. A decision about specific measurement does not 
lend itself to logical reasoning from a rule. It is context-specific, and, in the 
case of a personal order, managerial. While the decision is made under general 
rules, the context-specific nature of a solution militates against uniformity and 
adherence to or creation of precedent. Within a range of acceptable solutions, 
the trial judge’s judgment and range of experience determines the answer. After 
the decision, the measurement of a specific remedy for a specific dispute isn’t 
precedent, but guidance or a rule of thumb for a later decision. These consid-
erations muffle Steve’s cry to curb discretion when the judge is measuring a 
plaintiff’s remedy. 
An impious question is whether the Chancellor’s equitable discretion is, or 
ought to be, identical to a Common-Law decisionmaker’s discretion. How does 
equitable discretion compare to other primary decisionmakers’ discretion, a ju-
ry in a damage trial or a judge in a non-equity case? On one matter of choice of 
remedy the jury’s discretion resembles the judge’s broad equitable discretion. 
In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court said that punitive damages are discretion-
ary with the factfinder, and “are never awarded as of right, no matter how egre-
gious the defendant’s conduct.”359 
The historical record shows that juries tried lawsuits leading to discretion-
ary monetary relief.360 The jury has ample discretion in setting the amount of a 
plaintiff’s damages, which is a contextual and fact-specific decision. The jury’s 
discretion is particularly broad for a plaintiff’s nonpecuniary damages for pain 
and suffering. “Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an 
arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently the 
                                                        
355  29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15 (2012). 
356  18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2012). 
357  See generally James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Problem of Federal-State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing the 
Anti-Injunction Act and its affect on the allocation of decision-making authority between 
lower federal courts and state courts). 
358  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
359  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983). 
360  Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998). 
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judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go by; he can only 
tell them to allow such amount as in their discretion they may consider reason-
able. The chief reliance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to value 
suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common sense of the ju-
ry.”361 Similarly, valuing a deceased minor child’s services to her parents “is 
left to the sound judgment, experience, and conscience of the jury without any 
proof thereof whatever . . . . The value of a child’s services may be determined 
from all the evidence, including evidence as to the age and precocity of the 
child, its earning capacity, and the services rendered by it, the circumstances of 
the family and the living conditions, and from experience and knowledge of 
human affairs on the part of the jury.”362 
An appellate court won’t upset a jury’s verdict setting the amount of a 
plaintiff’s compensatory damages unless it shows “passion or prejudice” or 
“shocks the judicial conscience.”363 
In our nuisance trial, is the jury’s pain and suffering or emotional distress 
verdict entitled to as much respect and deference as Judge Pepper’s five-
hundred-steer permanent injunction? A few years ago, I thought so.364 Al-
though I had good company in equating the two,365 my earlier answer isn’t easy 
for me to affirm at the conclusion of this article. In my present analysis, I think 
it is nettlesome to answer this question because it compares two different 
things. 
The more general question is how to divide decisionmaking between the 
jury, the trial judge, and the appellate court. The jury decides questions of fact 
in trials “at common law.” The judge is the factfinder in equity. On the one 
hand, Professor Andrew Hessick wrote that damages follow the more rigid 
rules, while equity is flexible.366 On the other hand, the Supreme Court quoted 
Justice Brandeis that “the grant or withholding of remedial relief is not wholly 
discretionary with the judge.”367 Judge Posner’s observation that “the proposi-
tion that equitable relief is ‘discretionary’ cannot be maintained today without 
careful qualification,” goes a little farther.368 
                                                        
361  Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1966) (quoting McCormick on Damages, 
§ 88, pp. 318-319); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and 
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301, 317 (1998). 
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My earlier article emphasized the functional differences between remedies, 
principally between damages and an injunction. The damages jury goes home. 
It leaves the successful claimant to collect impersonally from the judgment 
debtor’s property. On the other hand, calculations about real-life context per-
force enter the judge’s decisions to choose, shape, and administer personal re-
lief. The judge who enters in personam equitable relief that requires the de-
fendant’s conduct must stick around to administer and enforce it. The judge’s 
duty is to secure the plaintiff’s substantive rights, perhaps with civil contempt. 
As trial judge Pepper watched and listened to the witnesses, she absorbed 
the context of the dispute. She may have visited BeefCo’s feedlot. The appel-
late court should respect most of her factual and measurement decisions. 
In the end, in this process of interaction between positivism and realism, 
rules and context, we cannot answer the questions finally. My conclusion is un-
tidy with loose ends. Lord Neuberger’s words about the United Kingdom’s 
constructive trust carry over to our general topic: 
The argument . . . is but one battle in a never-ending war. That war is between 
those who advocate the notion that equity should have rules which are clear and 
principled, so that outcomes can be predicted with confidence, and those who 
support the view that equity is concerned to be flexible and fair, so that out-
comes in individual cases can be seen to be just.369 
The tension between fidelity to a general rule, on one hand, and, on the 
other, equity as an ethical default from positive law to create justice in a dis-
crete dispute, will continue to be the steady diet of law practice, adjudication, 
law school classrooms, and law school exams. 
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